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HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 
World  Real  Interest  Rates* 
1. Introduction 
This study  began  with  the  challenge  to explain  why  real interest  rates 
were so high in the 1980s in the major industrialized  countries.  In order 
to address this challenge  we expanded  the question to the determination 
of real interest rates over a longer sample,  which  turned out to be 1959- 
88. In considering  how  real interest  rates were  determined  we  focused 
on the interaction between  investment  demand and desired saving in an 
economy  (ten  OECD  countries  viewed  as  operating  on  an  integrated 
capital market) that was large enough  to justify closed-economy  assump- 
tions. Within this "world" setting,  high real interest rates reflect positive 
shocks  to investment  demand  (such  as improvements  in the  expected 
profitability of investment)  or negative  shocks to desired saving (such as 
temporary  reductions  in  world  income).  Our  main  analysis  ends  up 
measuring  the first kind of effect mainly by stock returns and the second 
kind primarily by oil prices and monetary growth. 
We think  we  have  partial answers  to  how  world  real interest  rates 
have been  determined,  and,  more specifically, to why  real interest rates 
were as high  as they  were  in the 1980s. The key elements  in the period 
1981-86  appear to be favorable stock returns (which raised real interest 
rates and  stimulated  investment)  combined  with  high  oil prices (which 
also raised real interest rates, but discouraged  investment). 
In this paper we focus on the behavior of short-term real interest rates 
since 1959 in nine  OECD countries: Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), France 
(FR), Germany  (GE), Japan (JA), the Netherlands  (NE), Sweden  (SW), 
the United  Kingdom  (UK), and the United States (US). These countries 
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constitute  the set of industrialized  market economies  for which we have 
been  able to obtain  data since  the late  1950s on relatively  open-market 
interest  rates  for assets  that  are analogous  to  U.S.  Treasury bills.  For 
France and Japan, the  available  data are money-market  rates. We were 
unable  to obtain  satisfactory  data on interest  rates for Italy (IT) prior to 
the early 1970s, but we  included  Italian data on other variables; there- 
fore, parts of the analysis  deal with ten OECD countries. These countries 
accounted  in  1960  for  65.4% of  the  overall  real  GDP  for  114 market 
economies,  according to the PPP-adjusted data that were constructed by 
Summers  and  Heston  (1988). In 1985, the  share was  63.4%. Thus,  the 
sample  of ten  countries  represents  a substantial  fraction of the world's 
real GDP. 
We have  concentrated  thus far on short-term interest rates because  of 
the difficulty in measuring  medium-  or long-term expected inflation and, 
hence,  expected  real interest  rates. The quantification of expected  infla- 
tion is difficult even for short horizons,  although the results in this paper 
are robust  to these  problems.  The patterns  in short-term expected  real 
interest rates reveal a good  deal of persistence;  for example,  the rates are 
much  higher  for 1981-86  than  for 1974-79,  with  the  rates in the  1960s 
falling in between.  Given  the  ease  with  which  participants in financial 
markets  can  switch  among  maturities,  the  persisting  patterns  in  ex- 
pected  real  short-term  rates  would  also  be  reflected  in  medium-  and 
long-term  rates.  Therefore,  we  doubt  that the limitation  of the present 
analysis  to short-term  rates will be a serious  drawback. We plan,  how- 
ever, to apply the approach also to longer-term rates. 
2. Expected  Inflation  and Expected  Real  Interest  Rates 
Investment  demand  and desired saving depend  on expected real interest 
rates. The data provide  measures  of nominal  interest rates and realized 
real rates.  We could  carry out the  analysis  with  the realized  real rates, 
relying  on a rational-expectations  condition  to argue that the difference 
between  the realized  and expected  real rates, which  corresponds  to the 
negative  of the difference between  the actual and expected inflation rate, 
involves  a serially uncorrelated  random  error. Because the divergences 
between  actual and expected  inflation are likely to be large in some peri- 
ods,  much more precise estimates  could be attained by constructing rea- 
sonably accurate measures  of expected inflation and expected real interest 
rates. Thus,  we begin by estimating  expected  inflation rates. 
We have  quarterly,  seasonally  unadjusted  data on  an index  of  con- 
sumer  prices  for  each  country  beginning  in  1952:1.  (For the  United 
States,  we  used  the  CPI less  shelter  to avoid  problems  with  the  treat- World  Real  Interest  Rates  ?  17 
ment of housing  costs  in the data prior to 1983.) The results reported in 
this  paper  compute  expected  inflation  for  dates  t  =  1958:1 to  1989:4 
based on regression  forecasts for CPI inflation.  (Quarter 1 represents  the 
annualized  inflation rate from January to April, and so on.) Each regres- 
sion  uses  data on  inflation  for country  i from 1952:2 up  to the quarter 
prior to date t. That is,  the data before date t are equally weighted,  but 
later data are not used  to calculate forecasts. 
The  functional  form  for the  inflation  regressions  is  an  ARMA  (1,1) 
with deterministic  seasonals  for each quarter; thus,  expected  inflation is 
based  solely  on  the history  of inflation.  We considered  forms in which 
inflation depended  also on past values  of M1 growth and nominal inter- 
est rates, but the effects on the computed  values of expected real interest 
rates were minor.  (The nature of the relation between  inflation and past 
monetary  growth  and interest  rates also varied considerably  across the 
countries.)  Within the ARMA (1,1) form, the results look broadly similar 
across  the  nine  OECD countries;  typically,  the  estimated  AR(1) coeffi- 
cient is close  to 0.9 and the estimated  MA(1) coefficient ranges between 
-0.4  and  -0.8.  Q-statistics  for serial correlation are typically insignifi- 
cant at the  5% level,  although  they  are significant  in  some  cases.  The 
pattern of seasonality  varies a good  deal across the countries.  Appendix 
Table Al  shows  the estimated  equations  that apply for the nine countries 
over the sample  1952:2-1989:3. 
We computed  annual measures  of expected  inflation by averaging the 
four quarterly values  from the  regression  forecasts.  Figure 1 compares 
the constructed  annual time series for U.S. expected  inflation,  7us,t, with 
values  derived  from the six-month-ahead  forecasts from the Livingston 
survey  (obtained  from the  Federal Reserve  Bank of Philadelphia).  The 
two  series  move  closely  together,  with  a correlation of .92 from 1959 to 
1988.  The  main  discrepancies  are  the  more  rapid  adjustment  of  the 
regression-based  series  to actual inflation in the periods  1973-75  (when 
inflation rose) and 1985-86  (when  inflation fell). 
We calculated expected  real interest rates,  t, for country i in quarter t 
by subtracting the constructed  value for Tie  from the corresponding  nomi- 
nal  interest  rate,  Rit  (The  three-month  Treasury bill  rate  in  January 
matches  up with  the expected  inflation rate for January to April, and so 
on.) We then formed  an annual  series for rit  by averaging the four quar- 
terly values. 
The calculated values  for U.S.  expected  real interest rates for 1974-77 
are negative and average -1.2%,  whereas the values based on the Living- 
ston survey average 0.1% and are negative  only for 1975-77.  A plausible 
explanation  is that the regression  estimates  overstate the responsiveness 
of expected  inflation  to actual inflation  in the early 1970s. Many of the 18 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
Figure  1 EXPECTED  INFLATION  RATES  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 
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other eight  OECD countries  exhibit negative  values  of  i  for some of the 
years between  1972 and 1976, and an overstatement  of die  may also explain 
this behavior. (If we had used the full sample of data to compute ~it, rather 
than just the data prior to period t, the calculated sensitivity  of ~it to past 
inflation would  have been  even  greater. Thus, the tendency  to calculate 
negative  values  for it between  1972 and 1976 would  have been even more 
pronounced.)  Except for the U.K. for 1975-77  (r,UK  =  -.115,  -.027,  and 
-.058,  respectively),  the computed  negative values for r since 1959 never 
exceed  2% in magnitude.1 
The subsequent  analysis deals with the annual time series for expected 
real interest rates,  t.  The limitation to annual values arises because some 
of the other variables are available only annually.2 In any event,  the high 
1. Economic theory would  not rule out small negative values for expected real interest rates 
on nearly risk-free assets; however,  opportunities  for low-risk real investments  without 
substantial  transaction  costs  (including  storage  of durables)  would  preclude  expected 
real  rates  that  were  substantially  negative.  It  seems  likely  that  at  least  the  large- 
magnitude  negative  values  for rt represent  mismeasurement  of expected  inflation.  It 
would  be possible  to recompute  dt based  on the restriction that the implied  value for r4 
exceed  some  lower  bound,  such  as zero or a negative  number of small magnitude.  We 
have not yet proceeded  along these  lines. 
2. The main results reported below,  however,  involve  variables that are available quarterly. 
We are presently  working  on the results for quarterly data. World  Real Interest  Rates * 19 
Table 1  SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Means and Standard  Deviations of Main Variables,  1959-88 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Rwd,  t  .066  .024 
rrwd,  t  .049  .030 
rwd t  .017  .024 
erwa,  .046  .022 
wd,t  .020  .015 
(I/Y)wd,t  .234  .013 
STOCKwd,t_1  .022  .158 
POIL_i1  .560  .209 
DMWd,t-1  .080  .022 
RDEBTYWd,t_  .341  .076 
RDEFYwd,t1  .013  .017 
RDEFYA,  t_1  .000  .010 
Own-Country Variables 
WTit  ri  (I/Y)it 
Country  mean  stnd dev  mean  stnd dev  mean  stnd dev 
BE  .0147  .0004  .0414  .0143  .2151  .0296 
CA  .0433  .0019  .0283  .0206  .2279  .0137 
FR  .0815  .0038  .0163  .0208  .2401  .0247 
GE  .1002  .0038  .0311  .0197  .2444  .0304 
IT  .0621  .0019  .2765  .0377 
JA  .1315  .0305  .0199  .0190  .3183  .0422 
NE  .0202  .0009  .0102  .0195  .2396  .0344 
SW  .0131  .0010  .0178  .0243  .2222  .0286 
UK  .0806  .0081  .0124  .0348  .1951  .0187 
US  .4528  .0247  .0198  .0197  .2057  .0129 
STOCKi,  t-  DMi,,t 
Country  mean  stnd dev  mean  stnd dev 
BE  -.0115  .1711  .0568  .0405 
CA  .0121  .1608  .0926  .0778 
FR  -  .0125  .2322  .0974  .0427 
GE  .0322  .2479  .0789  .0400 
IT  -.0205  .2891  .1424  .0447 
JA  .0701  .2095  .1266  .0780 
NE  .0096  .2114  .0813  .0429 
SW  .0405  .2038  .0843  .0495 
UK  .0239  .2928  .0913  .0676 
US  .0178  .1715  .0570  .0315 
Note:  See Table  A2 for definitions  and sources  of the variables. 20 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
serial correlation in the quarterly series  on ri suggests  that we  may not 
lose  a lot of information  by confining  ourselves  to the annual  observa- 
tions.  The use  of annual  data means  also  that we  do  not  have  to deal 
with possible  seasonal  variations in expected  real interest rates. 
We constructed  a world index of a variable for year t by weighting  the 
value  for country  i in year t by the share of that country's  real GDP for 
year  t in  the  aggregate  real GDP  of  the  nine-  or ten-country  sample. 
(Henceforth,  "world" signifies  the aggregate  of the nine- or ten-country 
OECD sample.)  In computing  the  weights,  we  used  the  PPP-adjusted 
numbers  for real GDP  reported  by  Summers  and  Heston  (1988).  (For 
1986-89,  we  used  the  shares  for 1985, the final year of their data set.) 
None  of  our  results  changed  significantly  if  we  weighted  instead  by 
shares in world investment.  Table 1 shows  the average of each country's 
Summers-Heston  GDP  weight  (WT) from  1959 to  1988. Note  that the 
average  share for the United  States was  .45, that for Japan was  .13, and 
so on.  (In 1985, the U.S.  share was  .44 and the Japanese was  .17.) 
Figure 2 shows  the world values  (nine-country  sample excluding Italy) 
for actual and expected  inflation from 1959 to 1989. (Because we had data 
on  actual inflation  for  some  countries  only  up  to  the  third quarter of 
1989,  the  value  for  actual  inflation  in  1989 is  missing.)  Expected  and 
Figure  2 WORLD  ACTUAL  AND EXPECTED  INFLATION  RATES 
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actual inflation move  together  in a broad sense,  but the expected  values 
lag behind  the increases  in inflation in 1969, 1972-74,  and 1979-80,  and 
behind  the decreases  in 1982 and  1986. Figure 3 shows  the correspond- 
ing values for world actual and expected  real interest rates. Although  the 
two series move  broadly together,  a notable discrepancy is the excess  of 
expected  over actual real interest  rates for 1972-74.  The actual rates are 
negative  over this period (averaging  -2.3%),  but the computed  expected 
rates are positive  (averaging  1.1%). 
Figure 4 shows  the breakdown  of the world nominal interest rate into 
two  components:  the  world  expected  inflation  rate and  the  world  ex- 
pected  real interest  rate.  The graph makes  clear that the bulk of varia- 
tions  in  nominal  interest  rates  correspond  to  movements  in  expected 
inflation; the  correlation between  the nominal  interest  rate and the ex- 
pected  inflation  rate is  .79, whereas  that between  the.nominal  rate and 
the  expected  real  interest  rate  is  .44  (The  correlation  of  the  nominal 
interest rate with actual inflation is .62, whereas  that with the actual real 
interest rate is .24.) 
Many  authors  have  argued  that  expected  real interest  rates  among 
OECD countries  differ significantly  in terms of levels  and time patterns 
(see,  for example,  Mishkin  1984). Although  our findings  do not dispute 
Figure  3 WORLD  ACTUAL  AND EXPECTED  REAL  INTEREST  RATES 
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Figure  4 WORLD  NOMINAL  AND EXPECTED  REAL  INTEREST  RATES  AND 
EXPECTED  INFLATION 
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this  conclusion,  we  think  nevertheless  that a study  of the  movements 
of real interest  rates in the  main  OECD countries  can usefully  start by 
attempting  to explain  the common  elements  across the countries.  (Blan- 
chard and  Summers  1984 take a similar view.)  The comparison  of U.S. 
behavior  with  that of the  other  countries  in Figure 5 suggests  that the 
common  factors are worth  investigating.  The U.S.  expected  real interest 
rate moved  similarly  to  the  average  for the  other  eight  countries;  the 
correlation from 1959 to 1989 was  .73. 
A  simple  way  to  summarize  the  overall  movements  of the  expected 
and actual real interest rates, id,t and rw,,, is to consider the means of the 
two variables from Figure 3 over various subperiods.  The average values 
for rd,t (rwd,t)  were  2.0% (1.8%) for 1959-70,  1.2% (-1.0%)  for 1971-73, 
0.0% (-1.0%)  for 1974-79,  2.4% (1.8%) for 1980, 4.2% (5.3%) for 1981- 
86, 2.3% (2.8%) for 1987-88,  and 3.5% (3.4%) for 1989. These  data sug- 
gest  that it is  meaningful  to ask why  expected  and  actual real interest 
rates were  high  in the early 1980s.3 In our analysis  of the full-time series 
3. The rates for 1981-86  would  not look  so high  in a historical context from before World 
War II. Barro (1989, p. 242) shows  that U.S. realized real interest rates on assets compara- 
ble to prime commercial paper averaged about 8% from 1840 to 1900 (excluding  the Civil 
War), 3% from 1900 to 1916, and 5% from 1920 to 1940. World  Real Interest  Rates *  23 
Figure  5 EXPECTED  REAL  INTEREST  RATES  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 
EIGHT  OTHER  OECD  COUNTRIES 
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since  1959, we  add  the  questions  of why  the movements  in rates were 
relatively moderate  from 1959 until the early 1970s, why  the rates were 
so low in the middle  and late 1970s, and why  the rates fell after 1986 and 
rose in 1989. 
3. A Model  of Investment  Demand  and  Desired  Saving 
We think of "the" world expected  real interest rate, r-,,  as determined by 
the equation  in period  t of world  investment  demand  to world  desired 
saving.  This  setting  applies  to  the  ten-country  OECD sample  if,  first, 
these  countries  operated  throughout  the  sample  on  integrated  capital 
and  goods  markets,  and  second,  if the  ten  countries  approximate  the 
world,  and hence  a closed  economy.  We get some insight later about the 
integration of world markets by analyzing  the extent to which real inter- 
est rates in individual  countries respond  to own-country  variables rather 
than  world  variables.  The  approximation  that the  ten  countries  repre- 
sent  the  world  and  hence  a closed  economy  may be tenable,  first, be- 
cause these  countries  constitute  about 65% of the world's  real GDP (for 
market economies),  and  second,  because  the observed  current-account 24 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
balance for the ten-country  aggregate  has been very small. We added up 
each  country's  nominal  current-account  balance  (expressed  via current 
exchange  rates in terms of U.S. dollars) from 1960 to 1987 and divided by 
the total nominal  GDP (also converted  by exchange  rates into U.S.  dol- 
lars). The  average  value  of the  ratio of the  aggregated  current-account 
balance to overall GDP was 0.1%. Moreover, the largest value from 1960 
to 1987 (1971) was  only  0.5% and  the  smallest  (1984) was  only  -0.7%. 
We now  construct a simple  model  of investment  demand  and desired 
saving.  Although  this model  is used  to interpret some  of the empirical 
findings,  the general nature of the reduced-form results does not depend 
on this particular framework.  Hence,  readers who  are unimpressed  by 
our theory may nevertheless  be interested  in the empirical evidence. 
We measure  real investment,  It, by gross  domestic  capital formation 
(private plus  public,  nonresidential  plus  residential,  fixed plus  changes 
in stocks).  Thus,  It excludes  purchases  of consumer  durables and expen- 
ditures  on  human  capital.  Investment  demand,  expressed  as a ratio to 
GDP, is determined  by a q-type variable: 
(IIY)t  =  ao +  a,1  log[PROF7/(r?+p,)]  + u,  (1) 
where  PROF' is  expected  profitability  per unit  of  capital,  r< is  the  ex- 
pected real interest rate on assets like Treasury bills, Pt  is a risk premium, 
and a1>0. The error term ut is likely to be highly persistent because,  first, 
time-to-build  considerations  imply  that current investment  demand  de- 
pends  on  lagged  variables  that  influenced  past  investment  decisions, 
and second,  there may be permanent  shifts in the nature of adjustment 
costs,  which  determine  the  relation  between  investment  demand  and 
the q variable. In first-difference  form, equation  (1) becomes 
(I/Y)t =  a,  '  Alog[PROFt/(+pt)]  +  (I/Y)t_1  +  Ut-Ut-1.  (2) 
Our analysis  treats the error term, ut-ut_  , as roughly white  noise. 
We use  the  world  real rate  of  return  on  the  stock  market  through 
December of the previous  year STOCKt_i,  to proxy for the first difference 
of the q variable, Alog[PROF/(<+pt)].4 This proxying is imperfect because 
4. The stock-return  variable  for each country is the nominal rate of return for the year 
implied  by  the  IFS December  index  for industrial-share  prices  less  the  December-to- 
December  inflation  rate based  on  the  consumer  price  index.  We had  broader  stock- 
return measures  readily  available  for three  countries-Canada,  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  the  United  States-which  together  comprised  57% on  average  of the  ten-country 
GDP. The substitution  of these numbers  for the IFS values had a negligible impact on the 
regression  results  we  report later. We took this result as an indication  that the IFS data 
are probably satisfactory indicators of stock-market returns. World  Real  Interest  Rates  *  25 
of distinctions  between  average  and  marginal q,5 because  of failure to 
adjust  for changes  in  the  market  value  of bonds  and  depreciation  of 
capital stocks,  and because  the stock market values  only a portion of the 
capital that relates to our measure  of investment.  (The investment  num- 
bers  include  residential  construction,  noncorporate  business  invest- 
ment,  and  public  investment.)  For these  reasons,  the  best  estimate  of 
Alog[PROFI/(re+pt)]  would  depend  inversely  on  the  change  in rt, for a 
given  value  of  STOCKt_  .6 Therefore,  we  approximate  the  relation  for 
investment  demand  as 
(IIY)t =  ao +  a1 *  STOCKt,1  -  a,  (r~-_1)  +  (I/Y)t_  +  vt  (3) 
where a1>0 and a2>0.7 
We assume  that  the  desired  saving  rate (for the  world  aggregate  of 
national saving) is given  by 
(S/Y),  =  o  +  Pl(Y/Y)t  +  32r~  +  +3  *  (S/Y)t-1  +  error  term  (4) 
where  Yt  is current temporary income,  the  3i's  are positive,  and the error 
term  is  treated  as  white  noise.  Equation  (4)  adopts  the  permanent- 
income  perspective  in assuming  that permanent  changes  in income  do 
not  have  important  effects  on  the  saving  rate.  Temporary changes  in 
income  have  little  effect  on  consumer  demand  and  therefore  have  a 
positive  effect on the desired  saving  rate, as given by the coefficient ,1. 
Given the temporary-income  ratio, (Y/Y)t,  the saving rate would  respond 
positively  to r' in accordance with the coefficient /2.  The variable (S/Y)t_ 
picks  up  persisting  influences  on  the  saving  rate.  It turns  out  in  our 
empirical estimation  that 0<33<1  applies; that is, the desired saving rate 
appears  to  exhibit  less  persistence  than  the  investment-demand  ratio, 
which  has  a  unitary  coefficient  on  the  lagged  dependent  variable  in 
equation  (3). 
We considered  using  measures  of temporary government  purchases, 
5. See Hayashi  (1982) for a discussion,  in particular, of the adjustments  of marginal q for tax 
effects. 
6. Let STOCKt =  Alog(qt) +  et, where  qt =  [PROFt(t+pt]  and et can be  interpreted  as a 
measurement  error. Assume  that the prior distribution is given by Alog(qt) = et, that 4r  is 
observed  without  error, and  that no  direct information  about Pt is available.  Then the 
posterior estimate  of Alog(qt) gives  weights  to STOCKt  and (as a linear approximation) to 
-rt_l,  where  the  weight  on  -  t-_  rises  with  VAR(e)/AR(E).  (Independent  measure- 
ment  error in 4t  would  lower  the weight  applied  to 4-et-_).  Our analysis  uses  data on 
stock  returns  only  through  December  of the  previous  year (and thereby  avoids  some 
simultaneity  problems).  The omission  of contemporaneous  data on stock returns raises 
VAR(e) and thereby raises the weight  applied  to  t-rte,. 
7. The term (t-rte_ ) is approximately  linear if pt >>  applies. 26 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
especially  defense  expenditures,  as influences  on temporary income and 
hence  desired  national  saving  rates. Up to this point,  however,  we have 
been  unable  to  isolate  important  temporary  variations  in  the  ratios of 
real government  purchases  to real GDP over  the  period  since  1959 for 
the ten OECD countries  we  are studying. 
We have had more success  by thinking  of the relative price of oil as an 
indicator  of world  temporary  income.  Higher  oil prices  are bad for oil 
importers,  which  predominate  in  the  ten-country  OECD  sample.  Be- 
cause  higher  oil prices  tend  to reflect more effective  cartelization of the 
market for oil,  an increase  in prices  also  represents  a global distortion 
that is bad for the world  as a whole.  Moreover, high oil prices may be a 
signal of disruption  of international  markets in a sense  that goes beyond 
oil; therefore,  the effects  on world  income  may be substantially  greater 
than those  attributable to oil, per se. 
Our subsequent  analysis  of real interest  rates provides  some  indica- 
tion that the level  of the relative  price of oil,  rather than the change  in 
this relative price, is the variable that proxies for temporary income.  This 
result is reasonable  if the relative price of oil is perceived  to be stationary; 
in this case, a high level for the current relative price signals a temporar- 
ily  high  level.  In  the  actual  time  series,  the  relative  price  of  oil  did 
happen  to return after 1985 to values close to those applying before 1973. 
But our  direct  analysis  of  the  time-series  properties  of  the  relative  oil 
price is inconclusive  about stationarity.8 
The empirical analysis  uses  the variable POILt,_, which  is the relative 
price of  crude  petroleum  for December  of  the  previous  year from the 
U.S.  producer  price index.  The results  do not change  significantly  if we 
use  instead  a weighted  average  of  relative  petroleum  prices  for each 
country. The precise concepts  for these prices varied across the countries 
and the data for some countries were unavailable for parts of the sample. 
For these  reasons,  we used  the U.S.  variable in the main analysis.9 
Thinking  of POILt_1  as an inverse  measure  of the temporary income 
ratio, (Y/Y)t, the equation  for the saving  rate becomes 
(S/Y)t =  bo  -  bi *  POILt - + b2  r  + b3  (S/Y)t 1 + error term  (5) 
8. Even if the relative price of oil is nonstationary,  the consequences  of a change in the price 
of  oil  for world  income  are likely  to be  partly transitory. In particular, the  effects  on 
income would  tend to diminish  as methods  of production  adjusted to the new configura- 
tion of relative prices. 
9. The results are also similar if we use the dollar price for Venezuelan  crude instead of the 
U.S.  PPI for crude petroleum.  (The Saudi Arabian price is very close  to the Venezuelan 
price,  but  the  IFS does  not  report  the  Saudi  Arabian  values  after  1984.)  The  main 
difference  between  the Venezuelan  and U.S.  series is that the Venezuelan  one  shows  a 
much larger proportionate  increase in 1973. World  Real  Interest  Rates  *  27 
where  the  bi's are  positive.  We  assume  that,  given  the  stock  return, 
STOCKt_,,  the variable POILt_,  does not shift investment  demand in equa- 
tion  (2).  That  is,  at least  the  main  effects  of  oil  prices  on  investment 
demand  are assumed  to be captured by the stock-market variable. With 
this interpretation,  the variable POILt,  represents  a shift to desired sav- 
ing that is not simultaneously  a shift to investment  demand. 
We also assume  that the stock-market return, STOCKt_l,  has primarily 
permanent  effects  on income;  that is,  we  neglect  effects on the tempo- 
rary income  ratio, (Y/Y)t, and thereby on desired  saving in equation  (4). 
Given  this  assumption,  the variable STOCKt_,  reflects a shift to invest- 
ment  demand  that is  not  simultaneously  a shift  to  desired  saving.  In 
other words,  the variables STOCKt_1  and POILt_1  will allow us to identify 
the relations for investment  demand  and desired  saving. 
We might be able to quantify the interplay between  stock returns and 
temporary  income  by  using  measures  of  current profitability, such  as 
aftertax corporate profits.  That is, we  could estimate  the implications  of 
stock returns for the part of temporary income  that relates to the differ- 
ence between  current and expected  future profitability. We have thus far 
been unsuccessful  in obtaining satisfactory measures of corporate profits 
for  some  of  the  countries  in  the  sample,  and  therefore  have  not  yet 
implemented  this idea.  (The main data series available from the OECD, 
called  "operating  surplus,"  is an  aggregate  that is much  broader than 
corporate profits.)  The limited  data we  have  indicate that current stock 
returns  or other  variables  lack significant  predictive  content  for future 
changes  in  the  ratio of  corporate  profits  to GDP. It may, therefore,  be 
roughly  correct that stock returns have  little interplay with  the tempo- 
rary income  that  corresponds  to  gaps  between  current  and  expected 
future corporate profits. 
We now  extend  the  analysis  to consider  the effects  of monetary  and 
fiscal variables. We think of these variables as possible  influences  on the 
desired  saving  rate in  equation  (4).  In some  models  where  money  is 
nonneutral-such  as Keynesian  models  with  sticky prices or wages-a 
higher rate of monetary  expansion  raises temporary income and thereby 
increases the desired  saving rate.10  With respect to fiscal variables, many 
economists  (such as Blanchard 1985) argue that increases in public debt 
or prospective  budget  deficits reduce desired national saving rates. 
Let DMt_1  be a measure of monetary expansion and Ft_-  be a measure of 
10. In the analysis  of Mundell (1971),  higher monetary  expansion  leads to higher  expected 
inflation  and thereby  to a lower real demand for money. The reduction  in real money 
balances is assumed to lead to a decrease in consumer demand and hence to an 
increase  in the desired saving rate. Tobin  (1965)  gets an increase  in the desired saving 
rate  in a similar  manner. 28 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
fiscal expansion,  each applying  up to the end  of year t-  1. Then we  can 
expand  the relation for the desired  saving rate from equation  (5) to 
(S/Y),  =  bo -  b, * POILt,_  +  b2re +  b3(S/Y)t_, +  b4DMt-_ -  bFt,_, +  et.  (6) 
The  coefficients  are  defined  so  that  bi >  0  applies  in  the  theoretical 
arguments  discussed  above. 
Given  our  closed-economy  assumption  (for the  ten-country  OECD 
sample),  r'  is  determined  by  equating  the  investment-demand  ratio, 
(IIY)t  from equation  (3), to the desired  saving  rate, (S/Y)t  from equation 
(6). The reduced-form  relations for r' and (I/Y)t  are as follows: 
rt =  b)[a0-b0  + a, * STOCKt,  + b,  POILt_1  + a2 ' rt1 
(a2+b2) 
+  (1-b3)  . (I/Y)t_ -  b  * DMt 1 +  b5  Ft-,  +  vt 
- 
e,].  (7) 
1 
(IIY)t  =  *  [a b2+  + ab  a1b2  *  STOCKt-,  -  a2b1,  POILt,  + a2b2  *  1 
(a2+b2) 
+ (b2+a2b3)  (IIY),_ + a2b4 DM,t- -  a2b5 Ft-  + a2et + b2vt. 
(8) 
The  reduced  form  of  the  model  in  equations  (7) and  (8) implies  the 
following: 
1.  Higher stock returns,  STOCKt 1, raise r\ and (I/Y)t, 
2.  Higher oil prices,  POIL,_ , raise ri but lower (I/Y)t, 
3.  Higher monetary  growth,  DMt_ , lowers ri and raises (IIY)t  (in models 
where  monetary  expansion  stimulates  desired  saving), 
4.  Greater fiscal  expansion,  Ft,,,  raises  ri and  lowers  (IIY)t  (in models 
where  fiscal expansion  reduces  desired  national saving). 
Two additional implications  that concern lagged dependent  variables are 
more dependent  on  the  dynamic  effects built into the model  structure: 
5.  The  lagged  value  ri-, has  positive  effects  on  ri and  (IIY), (because, 
holding  fixed the other variables including  (IIY)t_  , a higher  ft_,  effec- 
tively shifts up investment  demand). 
6.  The lagged  value  (I/Y)t_1  has a positive  effect on (IIY)t  because  of the 
persistence  built  into  investment  demand  and  desired  saving.  The 
effect  on  re  is  positive  if  the  persistence  in  investment  demand  is 
greater than that in desired  saving; that is, if b3<l. World  Real  Interest  Rates  ?  29 
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4. Empirical  Analysis  of Expected  Real  Interest  Rates  and 
Investment  Ratios 
Table 1 contains  means  and  standard deviations  for the main variables 
used  in  the  analysis.  Table A2  in  the  Appendix  has  definitions  and 
sources  for the variables.  The world  ratio of real investment  (gross do- 
mestic capital formation) to real GDP appears in Figure 6. We use figures 
on  gross  investment  because  the  data on  depreciation  are likely  to be 
unreliable. As with the other world measures,  the investment  ratio is the 
GDP-weighted  value  of  the  numbers  from  the  ten  OECD  countries. 
World real stock  returns  (December-to-December)  are in Figure 7,  the 
December  values  for the relative price of oil are in Figure 8, and world 
growth  rates of M1 (December-to-December)  are in Figure 9. 
Figures 10-13  show  various measures  of fiscal stance.  Figure 10 plots 
the  ratios  of  real central  government  debt  to real GDP for the  United 
States and the nine  other OECD countries.1  (We presently  lack data for 
11. We lack data on debt for consolidated  general government  on a consistent  basis for the 
ten countries  in the sample.  The figures  that we  used,  which  were computed  in most 
cases from IFS numbers  on the par value of the aggregate of domestic  and foreign debt 
for central governments,  are gross  of holdings  by central banks,  certain government 
agencies,  and local governments. 30 ?  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
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Figure  9 WORLD  GROWTH  RATE  OF M1 
1988 on the debt of some  of the countries.)  Note  that the pattern for the 
United  States  is  broadly  similar  to  that  for  the  average  of  the  other 
countries.  Note  also that the U.S. debt-GDP ratio peaked in 1987 and fell 
in 1988. 
We define  the real budget  deficit to be the change  during the year in 
the central government's  outstanding  real debt.  Figure 11 shows  world 
values  for this  concept  of the  real budget  deficit when  expressed  as a 
ratio to real GDP. We plot the actual and cyclically adjusted values of the 
ratio. The cyclically adjusted  values  are the residuals  from a regression 
for each  country  over  1958-87  of the  real deficit-real GDP ratio on the 
current and four annual lags of the growth rate of real GDP. 
Figures  12 and  13 compare  the  U.S.  ratios for real budget  deficits  to 
real GDP with  those  for the nine other countries.  Figure 12, which plots 
ratios for actual real budget  deficits,  shows  that the recent U.S.  experi- 
ence  did not  depart greatly  from that for the average of the other nine 
countries.  Figure 13 shows,  however,  that recent values for the cyclically 
adjusted U.S. ratios were  substantially  higher than those for the average 
of the other nine countries.  But the adjusted  U.S. ratio fell from 4.0% in 
1986 to 1.9% in 1987 and 1.0% in 1988. 32 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
Figure 10 RATIOS  OF REAL  GOVERNMENT  DEBT  TO REAL  GDP FOR  THE 
UNITED  STATES  AND NINE OTHER  OECD  COUNTRIES 
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Figure  11 WORLD  RATIOS  OF REAL  BUDGET  DEFICITS  TO REAL  GDP 
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Figure  12 RATIOS  OF REAL  BUDGET  DEFICITS  TO REAL  GDP FOR  THE 
UNITED  STATES  AND NINE OTHER  OECD  COUNTRIES 
58  60  62  64  66  68  70  72  74  76  78  80  82  84  86  88 
5. Reduced-Form  Estimates  for the  World  Expected  Real 
Interest  Rate 
We begin  the  empirical  analysis  with  reduced-form  equations  for the 
world (nine-country)  expected  real interest rate,  ,t,  over the period 1959 
to 1988. Table 2, column  1, shows  a regression  of the form of equation 
(7), but with monetary  and fiscal variables excluded.  The estimated  coef- 
ficients of STOCKd,  t_  (.041, s.e.  = .011) and POILt_1  (.029, s.e.  = .009) are 
each positive  and  significant,  with  t-values  of 3.7 and 3.1,  respectively. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  estimated  coefficient  of  td,t-1  is also  positive  and 
highly significant (.58, s.e.  = .10). The estimated coefficient of (I/Y)d t-_1  is 
positive  (.22,  s.e.  =  .15), but not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Table 2, column  2 adds  the monetary  variable, DMd, t-,  which  is the 
GDP-weighted  average  of world  M1 growth  through  December  of the 
previous  year.12 We were  surprised  to find that DMWdt  1 entered  nega- 
12. We also examined  the growth  rates of currency and nominal  GNP as alternative mea- 
sures of monetary stimulus.  If the growth rate of currency through the end of year t-  1 is 
added to the basic regression  from Table 2, column 2 (which includes M1 growth for year 
t-1),  the estimated  coefficient  of the new  variable is insignificant  and the other results 
change little. If the growth  rate of world nominal GDP for year t-  1 is added to the basic 
regression,  the estimated  coefficient of the new variable is -.167,  s.e.  =  .093, t-value = 34 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
Figure  13 CYCLICALLY  ADJUSTED  RATIOS  OF REAL  BUDGET  DEFICITS  TO 
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tively  and  significantly  in  the  regression  for  r,t  (-.251,  s.e.  =  .054, 
t-value  = 4.7).  (We were  surprised because  previous  research suggested 
difficulty in isolating  these  kinds  of monetary  effects; see,  for example, 
Barro 1981.)  Moreover,  when  DMWd,t1  is added  to  the  regression,  the 
estimated  coefficients  for the  other  variables  become  more  significant: 
the t-values  are now  6.7 for STOCKwd,  t_  (.064,  s.e.  =  .009)13  and 5.5 for 
POILt-_ (.039,  s.e.  =  .007).14 The estimated  coefficient  of  (IlY)wdt-1  also 
becomes  significantly  positive  (.49, s.e.  =  .12), with a t-value of 3.9. 
1.8. The other results change  little; in particular, the estimated  coefficient of DMw,d  t-  is 
-.250,  s.e.  =  .051, which  is virtually unchanged  from that shown  in Table 2, column 2. 
(The world growth rates of Ml  and nominal GDP are essentially  orthogonal.)  The nearly 
significant  negative  coefficient  on  the  lag of nominal  GDP growth  may indicate  that 
exogenous  shifts in velocity  have  negative  effects on expected  real interest rates. 
13. The estimated  coefficient  of STOCKw,  t-l  changes  little if the individual  stock returns are 
weighted  by each country's  share of world investment,  rather than GDP. With invest- 
ment weights,  the estimated  coefficient  of STOCK  wd,t_1  is .060, s.e.  =  .010. 
14. If we add the second  lag value,  POILt_2,  the estimated  coefficient is -.023,  s.e.  =  .020. 
The hypothesis  that only the change in the relative price of oil, POILt_l-POILt_2,  matters 
is rejected at the 5% level  (t-value  = 2.7). If we replace the U.S. relative price of oil by a 
GDP-weighted  average of individual  country relative prices, the estimated coefficient of 
POILt_L  becomes  .042, s.e.  =  .010 (and the R2 of the regression  falls from .892 to .875). World  Real Interest  Rates - 35 
Table  2  REGRESSIONS  FOR  WORLD  EXPECTED  REAL  INTEREST  RATE 
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Note:  Standard  errors  are in parentheses.  a is the standard  error  of estimate  (adjusted  for degrees of 
freedom)  and DW  is the Durbin-Watson  Statistic.  The dependent  variable  in columns  1-4, 6,7 is r4,t.  In 
column  5 it is the nominal  interest  rate,  Rwd,t.  The  sample  period  is 1959-88  in columns  1-5. It  is 1959-72 
in column  6 and 1973-88  in column  7. 
It is possible  that the  apparent  effect  of M1 growth  represents  some 
kind of endogenous  response  of money  to the economy,  rather than the 
influence  of  exogenous  monetary  growth  on  real interest  rates.  Our 
failure in the next section  to find the predicted positive  relation between 
DMwd,t-  and the investment  ratio, (I/Y)t,  may support alternative interpre- 
tations  based  on  endogenous  money.  We carried out  some  analysis  of 
monetary  reaction functions;  these  results  indicate a negative  response 
of monetary  growth  to oil prices  and  stock  returns,  but not  to lags  of 
expected  real interest  rates or investment  ratios.  (DMwd t is itself serially 
uncorrelated; see Fig. 9.) Because we already held fixed the stock market 
and oil prices in the regression  for 4rd,,  we  do not see how  our findings 
about monetary  reaction can explain  the relation between  DMwd,t-  and 


































































-n15. 36 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
have  to  be  reflecting  information  about  future  real interest  rates  not 
already contained  in the other explanatory variables. 
The  explanatory  power  of  DMWdt_- for  wd,t  reflects  in  part the  well- 
known  cutback in world  M1 growth  in 1979 and  1980 (6.8% and 5.3%, 
respectively,  compared  with a mean of 8.0% for 1959-88).  This monetary 
contraction matches  up well with the increase in r,d, from 0.9% in 1979 to 
2.4% in 1980 and 4.7% in 1981. (With the monetary variable excluded  in 
Table 2, column  1, the fitted values  of  ed,t for 1980 and 1981 are 2.0% and 
3.4%,  respectively.  With  the  monetary  variable included  in  column  2, 
these  fitted values  become  2.5% and 4.4%.) The significance  of DM,d,  t_ 
in the regression  for red,  ,  however,  does  not depend  on the inclusion  of 
the  observations  for  1980-81.  If these  two  years  are omitted,  the  esti- 
mated  coefficient  of  DMwd,t-1  becomes  -.233,  s.e.  =  .066,  and  the  other 
results do not change  much from those  shown  in column 2. 
We have carried out the estimation  using the realized real interest rate, 
rwd,,  rather than our constructed  measure  of the expected  rate,  wd t. The 
error term in the regression  can then be viewed  as including  the discrep- 
ancy between  the actual and expected  real rate. Under rational expecta- 
tions,  this expectational  error would  be independent  of the explanatory 
variables, which  are all lagged  values.  The estimates would  therefore be 
consistent,  but  inefficient  relative  to a situation  where  rd,t is observed 
directly  and  used  as  the  dependent  variable.  Although  the  standard 
errors of  the  estimated  coefficients  are substantially  higher  when  rw, 
replaces  4d,t  as the  dependent  variable,  the basic pattern of the results 
remains  the  same.  Thus,  the  findings  do not depend  on our particular 
measure  for expected  inflation. 
Overall,  the regression  equation  in Table 2, column  2 does  a remark- 
able job of explaining  the variations in expected  real interest rates from 
1959 to 1988; see Figure 14 for a plot of actual values against fitted values 
and residuals.  Note that the out-of-sample  forecast of rd,t for 1989 is 3.2% 
compared  to an actual of 3.5%; for 1988, the estimated  value  was  1.9% 
and the actual was 2.3%. (We promise  that we generated the forecast for 
1989 before finding  the data on the actual value.) 
We will  discuss  more  features  of the  results  later, but some  key  ele- 
ments  for  the  1980s  are  the  generally  favorable  stock-market  returns 
combined with high oil prices. (Blanchard and Summers 1984, argue that 
improved  prospects  for profitability-which  we  pick  up  in  the  stock- 
market  returns-were  an  important  element  in  the  high  real interest 
rates of the  1980s.) The experience  for the  1980s contrasts with  the ex- 
tremely poor stock returns and lower oil prices that prevailed in the mid- 
1970s. The 1960s featured  still lower  oil prices,  but better stock returns 
than in the mid-1970s. World  Real Interest  Rates *  37 
Figure  14 ACTUAL  & FITTED  VALUES  & RESIDUALS  FOR  WORLD 
EXPECTED  REAL  INTEREST  RATE  (TABLE  2, COL.  2) 
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Columns  3 and 4 of Table 2 add fiscal variables to the regression  for 
wd,t.  Column 3 shows  a positive  but insignificant coefficient on the world 
debt-GDP  ratio,  RDEBTYW,t-,  and  a negative  but insignificant  coeffi- 
cient on the world ratio of real budget  deficits to real GDP, RDEFYd, t-.15 
The F-statistic for the inclusion  of the two fiscal variables jointly is F2 = 
1.6  (5% critical value  =  3.4).  Column  4 replaces  RDEFYd,t  1 with  the 
cyclically adjusted variable, RDEFYAd, t-.  The adjustment of real deficits 
for cyclical factors would  be  desirable  in  the  present  context  if the  re- 
moval  of these  factors raises  the  forecasting  power  for future ratios of 
real deficits  to  real GDP. The  estimated  coefficient  on  RDEFYAWdt  _  is 
close to zero, and that on RDEBTYWd  _1 remains positive but insignificant. 
The F-statistic for the inclusion  of the two fiscal variables is now  only F2 
=0.3. 
The  real budget  deficit  is  effectively  an  adjustment  of  the  nominal 
deficit for the effect of actual inflation on the outstanding  nominal debt. 
An  adjustment  for expected  rather than  actual inflation  is likely  to be 
preferable from the standpoint  of forecasting  future real budget  deficits 
(because  unexpected  inflation  is unpredictable).  We calculated ratios of 
15. Negative estimated effects of budget-deficit  variables  on interest rates were reported 
previously  by Evans  (1987)  (for  nominal  rates  in six OECD  countries)  and Plosser  (1987) 
(for  nominal  and real rates in the United States). 38 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
real budget  deficits  to  real  GDP  (adjusted  or  unadjusted  for  cyclical 
fluctuations)  in  this  manner,  but  the  results  differed  negligibly  from 
those  found  with  actual inflation. 
We also held  fixed the ratio of government  consumption  purchases  to 
GDP (which  entered  insignificantly)  and  experimented  with  the inclu- 
sion  of  current  or future  real budget  deficits.  In all cases  we  obtained 
similar results; the measures  of fiscal stance that we have considered  do 
not  help  significantly  in  explaining  the  time  series  for  expected  real 
interest rates. We are forced to conclude  that the evidence  supports  the 
Ricardian view,  which  deemphasizes  the roles of public debt and budget 
deficits in the determination  of real interest rates. 
Column  5 in Table 2 uses  the world  nominal  interest rate, R, t,  as the 
dependent  variable and adds the constructed measure of world expected 
inflation,  Td,  ,  on the right side. Measurement  error in 7ed,t would bias the 
estimated  coefficient  toward  zero,  but  the  estimated  value  (.89,  s.e.  = 
.09) differs insignificantly  from one.  Of course,  to the extent  that coun- 
tries levy  taxes on nominal  interest  payments,  the predicted  coefficient 
would  be somewhat  above unity. 
We tested  for the stability of the relation between  4d,t and the explana- 
tory  variables  by  estimating  the  specification  from  Table 2,  column  2 
separately for 1959-72  and 1973-88.  Thus, we split the sample before the 
oil crises  and  the  main  changes  in the  international  monetary  system. 
The estimates  for the  two  subperiods  appear in columns  6 and 7 of the 
table. The test for stability leads to the statistic F18 = 0.2; thus, we do not 
reject the hypothesis  that the same equation  applies  over both periods. 
To some  extent,  the failure to reject reflects the high standard errors that 
apply to the estimated  coefficients  for 1959-72  (column 6). For example, 
the  standard  error for the  estimated  coefficient  of POILt_ is enormous 
because of the small variations in relative oil prices from 1958 to 1971 (see 
Fig. 8).16  The data for 1959-72,  however,  do generate  marginally signifi- 
cant estimated  coefficients  on STOCKd,  t_  (.047, s.e.  =  .028) and DMWdt,,- 
(-.240,  s.e.  =  .132). 
6. Reduced-Form  Estimates  for World  Investment  Ratio 
We now  consider  the reduced  form for the investment  ratio in equation 
(8). Table 3 shows  regressions  over  1959-88  for the world  ratio of real 
16. The estimated  coefficient  of POILt_, differs insignificantly  from zero for samples  that 
begin  in  1959 and  end  as  recently  as  1979; for the  1959-79  sample,  the  estimated 
coefficient  is  -.003,  s.e.  =  .034. If the  sample  ends  in 1980, the estimated  coefficient 
becomes  .029, s.e.  =  .018. For samples  that end between  1981 and 1988, the estimated 
coefficient  is very stable, varying between  .038 and .040 with a standard error between 
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Table  3.  REGRESSIONS  FOR  WORLD  INVESTMENT  RATIO 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  .053  .057  .066  .076  -.016  .133 
(.031)  (.033)  (.051)  (.051)  (.125)  (.059) 
STOCKwd,t-1  .036  .034  .034  .031  .018  .045 
(.009)  (.011)  (.010)  (.010)  (.011)  (.016) 
POILt_1  -.016  -.017  -.030  -.020  .077  -.033 
(.008)  (.008)  (.010)  (.009)  (.172)  (.015) 
(I/Y)wd,t-  .814  .791  .848  .770  .92  .57 
(.122)  (.139)  (.183)  (.181)  (.26)  (.23) 
wd,t-  -.005  .000  .037  -.011  .043  -.057 
(.082)  (.085)  (.097)  (.101)  (.158)  (.118) 
DMwd,t-  .022  -.104  -.049  .064  -.127 
(.060)  (.075)  (.064)  (.054)  (.122) 
RDEBTYw,t-1  -  -.029  -.021 
(.027)  (.027) 
RDEFYwd,tl  .306 
(.125) 
RDEFYAWd,t_1  .331 
(.148) 
R2  .82  .82  .86  .86  .97  .82 
&  .0060  .0061  .0056  .0057  .0023  .0073 
DW  1.6  1.7  1.9  1.8  1.5  1.7 
Note:  The dependent variable  is (I/Y)wd,.  The sample  period  in columns  1-4 is 1959-88.  It is 1959-72  in 
column  5 and 1973-88  in column  6. 
investment  to real GDP, (I/Y)d,t.  The explanatory variables in these equa- 
tions are the same  as those  used  in Table 2. In the regression  shown  in 
Table 3, column 2, the main results are a significantly positive effect from 
STOCKWdt,_  (.034,  s.e.  =  .011),17 a  significantly  negative  effect  from 
POILt_1  (-.017,  s.e.  =  .008), and a significantly  positive  effect from the 
lagged dependent  variable (I/Y)wd,  t-  (.79, s.e.  = .14). The estimated coeffi- 
cients of rd,t-1  (.00, s.e.  = .08) and DMWd,t- (.022, s.e.  = .060) are insignifi- 
cant.  Figure  15 plots  the  actual values  for (I/Y)Wdt  along  with  the  esti- 
mated values  and residuals. 
The  results  on  the  world  investment  ratio  are consistent  with  the 
hypothesis  that  more  favorable  stock  returns  raise  investment  (along 
with raising real interest  rates) and that higher oil prices reduce invest- 
ment  (along  with  increasing  real  interest  rates).  On  the  other  hand, 
although  we  found  before that the expected  real interest rate was nega- 
17. Previous results of a similar nature for the United States were reported by Fama (1981). 
Barro (1990) reports analogous  findings  for the United States and Canada. 40 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
Figure  15 ACTUAL  & FITTED  VALUES  & RESIDUALS  FOR  WORLD  RATIO 
OF INVESTMENT  TO GDP (TABLE  3, COL.  2) 
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tively  related  to last year's  monetary  growth,  the results  do not reveal 
the expected  positive  response  of the investment  ratio. 
Columns  3 and 4 of Table 3 add the fiscal variables that we considered 
before; column  3 uses  the world variable for ratios of real budget  deficits 
to real GDP, and column  4 the variable for cyclically adjusted ratios. The 
estimated  effect  of  the  debt-GDP  ratio,  RDEBTYwd,t ,  is  negative  but 
insignificant  in both  cases.  The  estimated  effects  of the  budget-deficit 
variables,  RDEFYd,t-1  and  RDEFYAwd,t_, are each  significantly  positive- 
that is, the sign opposite  to that predicted by models where fiscal expan- 
sion lowers  the  desired  national  saving  rate. The positive  effect for the 
unadjusted  variable,  RDEFYd,,_,, accords  with  the negative  coefficient 
for this variable in the interest-rate  equation  (Table 2, column  3). How- 
ever,  the cyclically adjusted  variable,  RDEFYAwd,  -,  had a coefficient  of 
about  zero  in  the  interest-rate  equation  (Table 2,  column  4).  The fiscal 
variables considered  are jointly  insignificant  for the investment  ratio at 
the 5% level.  In the regression  shown  in Table 3, column 3, the statistic is 
F2 = 3.2 (5% critical value  = 3.4); for that in column 4, the statistic is F2 = 
2.6. Thus,  as with  the expected  real interest  rate, the fiscal variables do 
not have much explanatory  power  for the investment  ratio. 
We fit the equation  for the investment  ratio (Table 3, column  2) sepa- World  Real Interest  Rates ?  41 
rately over  1959-72  and  1973-88.  A test of stability for the coefficients 
yields  the  statistic  F% =  1.7 (5% critical value  =  2.7).  Columns  5 and 6 
show  the  estimates  obtained  over  the  two  subperiods.  The  standard 
errors for the estimated  coefficients  from the 1959-72  sample  tend to be 
high; however,  the estimated  coefficient  of STOCKd,  t-_  is positive  (.018, 
s.e.  =  .011). 
7. System  Estimates  for World  Expected  Real  Interest  Rate 
and  Investment  Ratio 
The structural model  in  equations  (3) and  (6) led  to the  reduced-form 
equations  (7) and  (8) for the expected  real interest  rate and investment 
ratio. In the previous  sections,  we estimated the two reduced-form equa- 
tions separately, ignoring  the overidentifying  restrictions that came from 
the  structure.  In this  section,  we  estimate  the  two  equations  as a joint 
system,  allowing  for the imposition  of the model's  restrictions as well as 
for correlation of the error terms across the equations.  Table 4 shows  the 
resulting  estimates  for the structural coefficients  that appear in equation 
(3) for investment  demand  and in equation  (6) for desired  saving.  Col- 
umns  1 and  2  apply  to  a  system  that  includes  monetary  growth  but 
excludes  fiscal variables.  Columns  3 and 4 add two  fiscal variables: the 
debt-GDP ratio, RDEBTYd, t_,  and the cyclically adjusted real deficit-real 
GDP  ratio,  RDEFYAwd,t-. 
We also fit the joint systems  for the expected  real interest rate and the 
investment  ratio  without  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  structural 
model.  Thereby  we  were  able  to  compute  likelihood-ratio  tests  of the 
overidentifying  restrictions.  For the model  without  fiscal variables,  the 
test  statistic  (for  -2  ? log[likelihood  ratio])  of  9.9  compared  to  a  5% 
critical value  from the X2  distribution  with 5 degrees  of freedom  of 11.1. 
In the model  with  fiscal variables,  the test statistic of 13.7 compared  to 
the 5% critical value  (with  7 d.f.)  of 14.1. Thus,  the model's  restrictions 
were not rejected at the 5% level in either case. Table 4 also compares the 
fits (in terms of R2  and -a  values)  for restricted and unrestricted forms of 
each  equation  separately.  The  fits for the  investment  equation  appear 
substantially  more sensitive  than those  for the interest-rate equation  to 
the imposition  of the model's  overidentifying  restrictions. 
The  two  fiscal  variables  are jointly  insignificant  when  added  to  the 
restricted joint system  (likelihood-ratio  statistic of 5.3 compared to a 5% 
critical value  of  6.0).  Since  the  other  results  are not  sensitive  to  the 
exclusion  of the fiscal variables, we focus now  on the estimates from the 
model  that excludes  the fiscal variables (columns  1 and 2 of Table 4). 
If one takes the structural model seriously, then two interesting results 42 *  BARRO & SALA-I-MARTIN 
Table 4  SYSTEM REGRESSIONS FOR WORLD EXPECTED  REAL INTEREST 
RATE AND  INVESTMENT RATIO 
Regression  Results 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Investment  Desired  Investment  Desired 
Demand  Ratio  Saving Rate  Demand  Ratio  Saving Rate 
Constant  0.0  .097  0.0  .135 
(.018)  (.030) 
STOCK,d  t_1  .051  .053 
(.010)  (.011) 
POILt1  -  -.033  -.040 
(.006)  (.007) 
(I/Y)w,t-1  1.0  .575  1.0  .475 
(.077)  (.107) 
Arwd,t  -.436  -.465 
(.126)  (.139) 
rwd,t  -  343  -.370 
(.069)  (.076) 
DMWd,t-1  .183  .145 
(.037)  (.035) 
RDEBTYWd,t_1  -.026 
(.015) 
RDEFYAwd,t_1  .144 
(.077) 
Fit Statistics 
rew,t  (I/Y)wd,t  rwd,t  (I/Y)wd, 
R2 (restricted)  .89  .76  .88  .78 
a (restricted)  .0057  .0073  .0062  .0073 
R2 (unrestricted)  .89  .82  .89  .86 
r (unrestricted)  .0054  .0061  .0056  .0057 
Note:  The sample period is 1959-88. The estimated  coefficients  apply to the model that is estimated 
subject  to the structural  restrictions.  For  the investment  demand  equation,  the constant  is set to 0 and 
the coefficient  of (I/Y)wd,-_1  is set to 1. Columns  1 and 2 apply to a model that excludes  fiscal  variables; 
columns  3 and 4 to a model that includes the two fiscal  variables  shown. In fit statistics  apply to the 
restricted  model and to an unrestricted  form  that  relaxes  the constraints  from  the structural  model. 
are the  estimated  responsiveness  of the  desired  saving  rate to the  ex- 
pected  real interest  rate (.34,  s.e.  =  .07 from Table 4, column  2) and the 
estimated  reaction of the investment-demand  ratio to the expected  real 
interest rate (-.44,  s.e.  =  .13, from column  1). The last coefficient has to 
be interpreted  as the effect of 4d,t on the investment-demand  ratio while 
holding  fixed the value  of the stock market. (Recall that, when  the stock World  Real  Interest  Rates  *  43 
return is an imperfect measure  of Aq,, the variable <-rt-1  provides  some 
independent  information about Aqt.)  The dependence  of the stock return 
on  d,t- wd,t-  suggests  that the estimated coefficient -.44  would underes- 
timate the magnitude  of the response  of the investment-demand  ratio to 
id,t  while  holding  fixed  expected  profitability, PROFg,  and the risk pre- 
mium,  Pt, but not the value of the stock market.18 
The estimated  model  implies  that desired national (gross) saving rates 
rise by  .34 percentage  points  for each  percentage-point  increase  in  ?r. 
Although  this form provides  a natural unit for thinking of the responsive- 
ness  of saving  rates to real interest rates, it appears to be more common 
to think in terms of elasticities.  Because the sample mean of (I/Y)wd,t  is .23, 
whereas  that for  wd,t  is only  .020, the implied  elasticities are small-only 
.03 at the  sample  means.  The  calculated  elasticities  would,  however, 
tend to be substantially  greater for net saving rates. 
Column  1 of Table 4 shows  that the estimated  effect of STOCKWd,  _  on 
the investment-demand  ratio is .051, s.e.  =  .010. Since the sample stan- 
dard deviation  of STOCKWd,  t  is .16, the result means that a 1 s.d. move in 
the  stock  market  changes  the  investment-demand  ratio by  .008 com- 
pared to a sample  s.d.  for (I/Y)wdt  of .013. The estimated  effect of POILt,_ 
on  the  desired  saving  rate in  col.  2 is  -.033,  s.e.  =  .006.  Given  the 
sample  s.d.  for  POIL_ 1 of  .21,  a  1 s.d.  move  in  the  relative  oil  price 
implies  a shift in the desired  saving rate by .007. 
Columns  1 and 2 show  that the estimated  effects of the lagged depen- 
dent variable,  (I/Y)wd,t_, are 1 for the investment-demand  ratio (as con- 
strained by the  model)  and  .58, s.e.  =  .08, for the desired  saving  rate. 
The greater persistence  of  investment  demand  than  of desired  saving 
generates  the  positive  relation  in  the  reduced  form between  4,dt  and 
(I/Y)wd,t-. If the coefficient  on (I/Y)d, t_  in the investment-demand  equa- 
tion is freed up,  the estimated  value  is .93, s.e.  =  .11. In this case,  the 
estimated coefficient of (IIY)d, t  in the saving-rate equation becomes  .55, 
s.e.  =  .09.  Thus,  this  unrestricted  version  of the  model  does  indicate 
significantly  greater persistence  in investment  demand  than in desired 
saving. 
Column  2 shows  the positive  estimated  effect for DMWd,t- on the de- 
sired  saving  rate  (.183,  s.e.  =  .037).  The  previous  discussion  of  the 
reduced  form indicated  that this estimate  stems  from the negative  rela- 
tion between  d,t  and DMd, tl,  and not from any relation between  (I/Y)wdt 
and DMw, _. 
Column  4 of Table 4 shows  that the estimated  effect of the debt-GDP 
18. Serial correlation of the error term in the equation  for r4,, would,  however,  likely lead 
to an overestimate  of the sensitivity  of investment  demand  to a change in the expected 
real interest rate; see the coefficient a2  in equations  (3) and (7). 44 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
ratio on the desired  saving  rate is negative  but insignificant  (-.026,  s.e. 
= .015). The cyclically adjusted deficit variable has a positive and margin- 
ally significant estimated  effect on desired saving (.144, s.e.  =  .077). This 
"wrong" sign accords with the results discussed  before in Table 3. 
8. Simulations  for Expected  Real  Interest  Rates  and 
Investment  Ratios 
8.1 WHY  WERE  EXPECTED  REAL  INTEREST  RATES  SO HIGH  IN 
1981-86? 
We can use  the estimated  model  for the expected  real interest rate and 
the investment  ratio to assess  the frequently  asked question: Why have 
real interest  rates been  so high in the 1980s? We approach this question 
Table  5  SIMULATED  EFFECTS  ON EXPECTED  REAL  INTEREST  RATES 
AND INVESTMENT  RATIOS  (RESULTS  REFER  TO MEANS  FOR 
THE  PERIODS  INDICATED) 
Simulated  Initial 
Actual  Total  STOCK  POIL  DM  Conditions 
I. Study period:  1981-86; reference  period:  1975-80 
Restricted model 
Arwd,t  .039  .038  .025  .019  .003  -.009 
A(I/Y)d,t  -.011  -.009  .014  -.009  -.002  -.012 
Unrestricted Model 
Arwd,t  .039  .031  .021  .014  .005  -.009 
A(IY)wdt  -.011  -.015  .012  -.015  -.001  -.011 
II. Study period:  1975-80; reference  period:  1965-70 
Restricted model 
Ard,  t  -.022  -.013  -.018  .011  -.007  .001 
A(I/Y)wd,t  -.015  -.010  -.011  -.005  .003  .003 
Unrestricted  model 
Ared  t  -.022  -.011  -.015  .009  -.008  .003 
A(I/Y)wd,t  -.015  -.010  -.008  -.008  .001  .005 
III. Study period:  1987-88; reference  period:  1985-86 
Restricted  model 
Arwd,t  -.017  -.021  .002  -.019  -.001  -.003 
A(I/Y)wdt  .011  .009  .002  .008  .001  -.002 
Unrestricted  model 
Are d,t  -.017  -.020  .002  -.017  -.002  -.003 
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Table  5  SIMULATED  EFFECTS  ON EXPECTED  REAL  INTEREST  RATES 
AND INVESTMENT  RATIOS  (RESULTS  REFER  TO MEANS  FOR 
THE  PERIODS  INDICATED)  (CONTINUED) 
Simulated  Initial 
Actual  Total  STOCK  POIL  DM  Conditions 
IV. Study period:  1989; reference  period:  1988 
Restricted  model 
Ard,t  .011  .014  .015  -.005  -.003  .007 
A(IlY)wd,t  .017  .005  .002  .001  .009 
Unrestricted  model 
Arwd,t  .011  .013  .015  -.004  -.003  .006 
A(I/Y)W  -  .019  .008  .002  .000  .009 
Means of Variables  Initial Conditions 
Period  rwd,t  (IlY)d,t  STOCKWd,t-l  POILt-1  DMwd,t-  rwd,t-  (Y)wd,t-1 
1989  .0347  (.247)  .1484  .406  .0661  .0233  .242 
1988  .0233  .242  -.0817  .519  .0541  .0225  .230 
1987-88  .0229  .236  .0847  .470  .0895  .0401  .225 
1985-86  .0395  .225  .1370  .839  .0906  .0443  .226 
1981-86  .0424  .219  .0769  .927  .0791  .0245  .226 
1975-80  .0031  .230  -.0624  .601  .0880  .0061  .249 
1965-70  .0247  .245  .0092  .407  .0677  .0219  .238 
Note: The column  labeled  "Simulated Total" refers to the change in the average simulated  value of rd, t 
or (IIY)Wd,t  from the  reference  period  to the  study  period.  These  dynamic  simulations  use  the actual 
values of STOCKwd  t  1, POILt_1,  and DMWd,t_l,  and the actual initial values of re,  t-_ and (I/Y)wd  t-  at the 
beginnings  of  the  reference  and  study  periods.  The column  labeled  "STOCK"  shows  the part of the 
change in the simulated  values  attributable to differences in the time series of STOCKWd,  t_  for the study 
and  reference  periods.  The  other  columns  give  the  corresponding  information  for differences  in the 
time series  of POIL_1,  DMWd,t-_1 and the values  for rwdt-l  and  (I/Y)wd,t-l  at the start of the study  and 
reference periods.  The value  (I/Y)d,t  for 1989 is based on incomplete  data. 
by comparing the period 1981-86,  during which the average value of rd,t 
was  4.2%,  with  an  earlier reference  period  of  equal  length,  1975-80, 
during which the average of  wd,t  was 0.3%. Hence,  we seek to explain the 
increase in the average expected  real interest rate from 1975-80 to 1981- 
86 by 3.9 percentage  points. 
According  to the model,  the  differences  in averages  of expected  real 
interest  rates  should  be  explicable  mainly  in  terms  of  differences  in 
stock-market returns, oil prices, and monetary growth.  Some role would 
also be played by differences in initial conditions for rd,t-  and (I/Y)wd,t-l  (in 
1981  compared  to  1975).  Note  from  Table  5  that  the  averages  for 
STOCKWdt  -  were  7.7%  in  1981-86  versus  -6.2%  in  1975-80,  those  for 
POILt_  were  0.93  in  1981-86  versus  0.61  in  1975-80,  and  those  for 46 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
DMd,t-l  were  7.91% in 1981-86  versus  8.80% in 1975-80.  The difference 
in initial conditions  were  .0245 for 4d,t-1  in 1981 versus  .0061 in 1975, and 
.226 for (I/Y)wd,t- in 1981 versus  .249 in 1975. 
We can simulate  the estimated  model  to estimate  the extent to which 
the higher average for r1dt in 1981-86 than in 1975-80 can be attributed to 
differences in STOCKwd,  t_,  POIL,_  , DMWdt-,,  and the initial conditions  for 
4d,t-l  and (I/Y)wd,t_. We consider  the restricted version of the joint model 
as reported  in  Table 4 and  also  the  unrestricted  version  that does  not 
impose  the  overidentifying  restrictions  from the  structure. We also ne- 
glect any interplay among  STOCK,, t, POILt,  and DMd,  ; that is, we treat 
the time paths  of these  three variables as exogenous.19 
Given the actual time paths  for STOCKwd,B  POILt,  and DMWd,t,  and the 
actual values for w  ,t-  and (IY)wd,t- in 1981 and 1975, dynamic simulations 
of the  restricted  model  for 1981-86  and  1975-80  predict an increase  in 
the  average  of  wd,t  of 3.8  percentage  points  compared  to the actual in- 
crease  of  3.9  points  (see  the  columns  labeled  "Simulated  Total" and 
"Actual" in  section  I of  Table 5).  We then  dynamically  simulated  the 
restricted model for 1981-86 with the values of STOCKWd,  t-  from 1975-80 
substituted  year by year for those  in  1981-86.  This simulation  implied 
that 2.5 percentage  points of the increase in the average of rwdt from 1975- 
80 to 1981-86  derived  from the  higher  average  for stock returns in the 
latter period  (see  the column  labeled  "STOCK"  in the table).20  Similarly, 
we  found  that  1.9  percentage  points  of  the  rise in  the  average  of  rwd, 
resulted  from the increase in average oil prices (the column  "POIL"),  0.3 
points  from  the  lower  average  monetary  growth  (the  column  "DM"), 
and  -0.9  points  from  the  differences  in  initial  conditions.  The  main 
change  in the initial conditions  is the much lower value  for (IIY)w  ,_1 in 
1981 than in  1975; this effect by itself would  have  lowered  real interest 
rates  for  1981-86.  The  results  from  simulations  of  the  unrestricted 
model,  shown  in Table 5, are basically similar. 
Table 5 also indicates  the simulated  results for investment  ratios. The 
restricted model predicts that the average of (IIY)w,t  for 1981-86 would be 
19. We do  find  a significant  negative  relation  between  stock  returns  for year  t and  the 
change in oil prices during year t. Also, M1 growth has significant negative reactions to 
the contemporaneous  change  in oil prices and to lagged stock returns. We can filter the 
stock returns to compute  the component  exogenous  to oil-price changes,  and we  can 
filter M1 growth  to calculate the part exogenous  to oil-price changes  and lagged  stock 
returns.  In the  discussion  below  we  attribute changes  in expected  real interest  rates 
and  investment  ratios  to  the  behavior  of  stock  returns,  oil  prices,  and  monetary 
growth.  The breakdown  among  these  three variables would  change if we  shifted from 
gross numbers  to the filtered values. 
20. The results depend  not only on differences  in the average value of STOCK., _,, but on 
differences  in  the  time  pattern.  It is  possible  for the  simulated  effects  to  go  in  the 
direction opposite  to that suggested  just from a comparison  of means. World  Real Interest  Rates *  47 
0.9 percentage  points  below  the  average  for 1975-80,  compared  to the 
actual shortfall  of  1.1  points.  The  simulations  attribute 0.9  percentage 
points  of the decline  in the average investment  ratio to higher oil prices, 
-1.4  points  to the more favorable stock returns (which,  by themselves, 
would  have  raised  the investment  ratio), 0.2 points  to lower  monetary 
growth,  and  1.2  points  to  differences  in  initial  conditions.  The  main 
element  in the initial conditions  is again the lower value for (I/Y)d,,t-  in 
1981 than  in  1975. The  results  from  the  unrestricted  model  are again 
similar. 
8.2 WHY  WERE  EXPECTED  REAL  INTEREST  RATES  SO LOW  IN 
1975-80? 
We now  compare  the  low  average  for rWd,t  in  1975-80,  0.3%, with  the 
higher value,  2.5%, that prevailed  during an earlier reference period of 
the same length,  1965-70.  (The results are similar if we  pick alternative 
six-year reference periods in the 1960s or early 1970s.) Section II of Table 
5 shows  that simulations  of the restricted model predict a decline of only 
1.3  percentage  points  in  the  average  of  7d,  from  1965-70  to  1975-80 
compared  with  the  actual decrease  of 2.2 points.  The model  attributes 
1.8 percentage  points  of the decline  to lower stock returns,  -1.1  points 
to higher  oil prices (which,  by themselves,  would  have raised expected 
real interest  rates),  0.7  points  to  higher  monetary  growth,  and  -0.1 
points  to  differences  in  initial  conditions.  The  results  from  the  unre- 
stricted model  are similar. 
Overall, the largest factor behind  the differences in expected real inter- 
est rates among the three periods,  1965-70,  1975-80,  and 1981-86,  is the 
variation in stock returns.  The fall in real interest rates from 1965-70  to 
1975-80  goes  along  with  a worsening  of  stock  returns  (from 0.9% to 
-6.2%),  and  the  steep  rise in rates in  1981-86  reflects  sharply  higher 
stock returns  (7.7%). The  movements  in oil prices are also  important, 
although  higher  oil  prices  in  1975-80  compared  to  1965-70  partially 
counteract the movement  to lower real interest rates. The increase in oil 
prices  in  1981-86  compared  to  1975-80  reinforces  the  stock market in 
generating  a shift toward higher real interest rates. 
8.3 WHY DID EXPECTED REAL INTEREST RATES FALL IN 1987-88 
AND  RISE IN 1989? 
The average of 4dt  fell by 1.7 percentage  points from 1985-86 to 1987-88 
and  then  rose  by  1.1 percentage  points  from 1988 to 1989. Sections  III 
and IV of Table 5 contain  simulations  for these  periods.  The dominant 
factor behind  the decline  in real interest rates in 1987-88 is the fall in oil 
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much  more  favorable  stock  return  in  1988 (15.0%) compared  to  1987 
(-8.2%). 
We have  assembled  nearly  complete  data  for  1989 on  the  variables 
STOCKw,  t, POILt,  DMwd,t,  (IIY)wd,,t  and  wd,t-  Using these values,  we can use 
the model to forecast the expected  real interest rate and investment  ratio 
for 1990. Remarkably, the restricted model  implies  a predicted value for 
4d,t of 5.6% (5.5% from the  unrestricted  model).  The forecast from the 
restricted model  for 1990 not only constitutes  an increase by 2.1 percent- 
age points  in red  from the value  prevailing  in 1989, it also represents  a 
level that is almost a full percentage  point above the highest value of the 
entire  previous  sample,  1958-89.  The  five  determinants  of  rd,  in  the 
model  all point  in the direction  of higher  real interest rates in 1990: the 
favorable stock return (17.4% in 1989 versus  14.8% in 1988) accounts for 
0.1 percentage  point,  the increase  in oil prices (.525 versus  .406) for 0.5 
percentage  point,  reduced  monetary  growth  (3.2% versus  6.6%) for 0.8 
percentage  point,  and the change in initial conditions  (the rise in (IY)wd,t 
from .242 in 1988 to .247 in 1989 and the increase in 4wt from .023 in 1988 
to .035 in 1989) accounts  for 0.9 percentage  point.  Needless  to say, this 
prediction of a rise in the expected  real interest rate to a range not seen at 
least  in the  last 30 years  will  provide  a severe  test  of the model.  With 
respect  to  the  investment  ratio,  the  restricted  model  predicts  little 
change  from 1989 (.246 in 1990 versus  .247 in 1989), whereas  the unre- 
stricted model  projects an increase by 0.3 percentage  point. 
Given the stress on fluctuations  in the stock market, we would  like to 
know what fundamental  factors underlie these fluctuations.  (We would, 
of course,  also like to understand  the  forces that lead to changes  in oil 
prices  and  monetary  growth.)  We interpret  stock returns  as reflecting 
changes in the expected  profitability of investment,  PROFt,  and in the risk 
premium,  Pt. We plan to use  data on actual profitability to separate the 
influences  from these  two channels.  At this point, we can only note that 
the fluctuations  in stock prices could  derive from technological  innova- 
tions, changing  conditions  of labor markets or international competition, 
shifts in government  policies with regard to taxation and regulation,  and 
so on. Although  we have not isolated the main forces that influence stock 
returns, the findings  suggest  that these forces are crucial for the determi- 
nation of expected  real interest rates and investment  ratios. 
9. Systems  for Individual  Countries'  Expected  Real 
Interest  Rates 
In the  world  model  with  an integrated  capital market,  "the" expected 
real interest rate depends  on world variables, which include world aggre- World  Real  Interest  Rates  .  49 
gates  of stock returns and monetary  growth  and the world price of oil. 
Thus, the reduced form in equation (7) gives an expression  for ft in terms 
of these  world  variables.  In practice, we  observe  individual  time series, 
4, for each country i. In the previous  analysis we combined  these obser- 
vations into a world index,  '4d,  t  that gives more weight  to countries with 
higher shares in world real GDP. Then we related this world index to the 
world influences  suggested  by the structural model. 
We can think of each country's expected real interest rate as determined 
by the hypothetical  world rate-which  depends  on world variables in the 
manner suggested  by the structural model-plus  some own-country  fac- 
tors. That is, 
I  =  t +  it  (11) 
where  xit represents  variables particular to country i and i  depends  on 
the world variables as in the previous  analysis.  Unless the xt are random 
errors that are perfectly  correlated across  the  countries,  we  would  get 
more efficient estimates  of the determinants  of i  by using all the individ- 
ual observations  on  the  r  for the  nine  countries,  instead  of combining 
everything  into the world weighted  average, rd,t. That is, we can think of 
equation  (11) as  a system  of  nine  equations,  and  we  can estimate  the 
variance-covariance  structure of the error terms, xi,  along with the esti- 
mation of the coefficients  for the variables that determine  rt. 
When we look empirically at the values  of r for an individual  country, 
we typically find a good  deal of serial persistence  about the rate, 4, that 
can be explained  by worldwide  forces. We can allow for this effect more 
or less equivalently  by including  (t-1  as an element  of xt or by treating xi 
as an error term that is  serially correlated.  Because  it is simpler  in the 
systems  discussed  below  and also delivers  somewhat  better fits (at least 
relative to an AR(1) model  for the xt), we take the approach of including 
rt-I  as a regressor.21 We do not make any structural interpretations  for 
the  statistical  significance  of  this  lagged  dependent  variable.  It could 
reflect a variety  of  own-country  forces  that we  do  not  hold  constant, 
including  serially correlated measurement  error in nominal interest rates 
or expected  inflation and persisting  differences  across countries in riski- 
ness  of real returns or the tax treatment of these  returns. 
If the world  capital and goods  markets are fully integrated,  shifts to a 
single  country's  investment  demand  or  desired  saving  affect  the  ex- 
pected  real interest  rate only  to  the  extent  that  these  shifts  affect the 
21. Once we  hold  fixed rt_1, the determinants  of rt,  (which  are second  lags of the world 
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world  aggregate  of  investment  demand  or desired  saving.  Therefore, 
own-country  variables like country i's stock return and monetary growth 
would  matter for  i  only  to the extent  that they  contribute to the world 
aggregates  of stock returns and monetary  growth.  With the world vari- 
ables held constant,  the importance of these own-country  variables for r 
will  provide  some  evidence  about  the  extent  of country  i's integration 
into  world  markets.  If the  own-country  variables  are unimportant  for 
country  i,  we  cannot  conclude  unambiguously  that  country  i is  well 
integrated; that is, country i could be isolated from the rest of the world, 
but rt may  nevertheless  be insensitive  to the  own-country  explanatory 
variables we  consider.  We get clearer evidence  from observations  in the 
reverse direction; if  i  depends  in an important way on the own-country 
variables for country i, then we have an indication that the country is not 
well integrated  into world markets. 
Table 6 contains  system  estimates  for rt for nine  countries  over 1959- 
88.  The  estimation  is  by  generalized  least  squares,  which  allows  for 
estimation  of  each  country's  error variance  and  of  contemporaneous 
covariances  across the countries.  Roughly  speaking,  the method  of esti- 
mation  differs  from that in Table 2 in that the weight  for each country 
now  depends  mainly on the estimated  error variance, rather than on the 
relative GDP. 
We begin with a model that, aside from f,t-  and individual constants for 
each  country,  includes  only  the  world  variables we  considered  before: 
STOCKwd,t-_ POILt,_,  (I/Y)wd,t-_  and  DMWd,  t,.  These  results  are in column  1 
of Table 6. The estimated  coefficients  on each of the independent  vari- 
ables, including  the lagged  dependent  variable, are constrained to be the 
same for each country. In this form, the estimates are similar to those from 
the comparable equation  for  wd,t (Table 2, column 2). The main difference 
(with the increase in the overall number of observations from 30 to 270) is 
the reduction  in the standard errors for the estimated  coefficients. 
Column  2 of  Table 6 adds  three  own-country  variables:  STOCKit_l, 
(I/Y)i,_l, and DMi, _,. (We assume  that POILt_1  takes on the same value for 
each country; therefore,  we cannot distinguish  world from own-country 
values  in this case.)  We constrain  the coefficients  of the three own  vari- 
ables to be the same across the nine countries.  In this form, a test of the 
hypothesis  that the  coefficients  on the three own-country  variables are 
all zero  leads  to  the  likelihood-ratio  statistic  2.7  compared  to  the  5% 
critical value  of  7.8.  Thus,  we  accept  the  hypothesis  that own-country 
expected  real interest  rates depend  on the world variables and not own- 
country  variables  (aside  from  the  individual  constant  and  the  lagged 
dependent  variable). Table 6  NINE-COUNTRY  SYSTEMS FOR EXPECTED REAL INTEREST RATES 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Constant  separate  separate  separate  -.087  separate  separate  separate 
(.020) 
STOCKwd,t-  .048  .052  -  .040  .049  .048  .032 
(.006)  (.007)  (.007)  (.006)  (.006)  (.006) 
POIL,_1  .043  .043  .030  .034  .049  .044  .071 
(.005)  (.005)  (.006)  (.005)  (.005)  (.005)  (.005) 
(IY)wt  .521  .505  -  .408  .447  .549  .575 
(.080)  (.087)  (.084)  (.095)  (.098)  (.083) 
ri  .  .484  .500  .515  .651  .458  .476  .352 
(.041)  (.042)  (.048)  (.036)  (.042)  (.044)  (.036) 
DMwd,t-1  -.245  -.255  -  -.225  -.161  -.231  -.146 
(.035)  (.038)  (.037)  (.044)  (.040)  (.036) 
STOCKi,  t1  -.005  -.004  -  - 
(.004)  (.004) 
(IY)it-1  -  .009  .023 
(.027)  (.026) 
DMi,t_  -  .027  .016  - 
(.013)  (.013) 
RDEBTYw,t  -  -  .016  .008 
(.014)  (.015) 
RDEFYt_  -  -.231  - 
(.074) 
RDEFYAwd,,  t-  -  --  -.061 
(.090) 
_-  -_  -  .562 
(.034) 
Note: The sample  period  is 1959-88.  The dependent  variables  in columns  1-6  are ri for nine  countries.  In column  7 the dependent  variables  are the  nominal 
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Column  3 of  Table 6 retains  the  three  own-country  variables  added 
in column  2,  but  deletes  the  corresponding  three  world  variables, 
STOCKwd,t_l (I/Y)wdt_l, and  DMdt  _1.  A  test  of  the  hypothesis  that  the 
coefficients  of  these  three  world  variables  are  all  zero  leads  to  the 
likelihood-ratio  statistic  27.8  compared  to  the  5% critical value  of  7.8. 
Therefore,  the  data  reject  the  hypothesis  that  own-country  expected 
real interest  rates depend  on the own-country  variables and not on the 
world variables. 
Overall,  the  results  in columns  1-3  provide  evidence  that individual 
country  expected  real interest  rates depend  more on worldwide  forces 
than own-country  forces.  In this sense,  the results suggest  that the nine 
OECD countries  were  operating  to a considerable  extent  on integrated 
world markets. Note,  however,  that the results presented  thus far apply 
when  all countries  are constrained  to have  the same coefficients  on the 
world  and  own-country  variables  (aside  from  an  individual  constant 
term). 
We tested  whether  the  system  regression  in Table 6,  column  1 was 
stable  over  the  periods  1959-72  and  1973-88.  The  test  for equality  of 
coefficients  over the two samples  is accepted  (likelihood-ratio statistic of 
8.8, 5% critical value with  14 restrictions of 23.7). 
Column  4  of  Table 6  constrains  the  constant  terms  to  be  the  same 
across the countries.  The hypothesis  of equality is strongly rejected: the 
likelihood-ratio  statistic is 48.1 compared to a 5% critical value of 15.5. In 
this  sense,  we  confirm  the  general  belief  that the average  levels  of ex- 
pected  real interest  rates differed significantly  across the nine countries. 
Columns  5 and 6 of Table 6 add the world  fiscal variables, which  we 
considered  before.  The results  are similar to those  found  for the world 
real interest  rate in Table 2: the debt variable is insignificant,  the unad- 
justed  deficit variable is significantly  negative  (-.23,  s.e.  =  .07 in Table 
5, column  5), and  the cyclically adjusted  deficit variable is insignificant 
(column 6). 
Column  7 of  Table 6 uses  nominal  interest  rates,. Rit, as  dependent 
variables and adds the expected  inflation rate, 7it, on the right side.  The 
estimated  coefficient  on 77i  (constrained  to be the same across the coun- 
tries) is now  significantly  less than one: .562, s.e.  =  .034. To some extent, 
this result is sensitive  to the U.K.  data, which  exhibit sharply negative 
values for rt in the mid 1970s. If the United Kingdom is allowed to have its 
own  coefficient  on  7rk,t  the  estimated  coefficient  on  k  t is  .42,  s.e.  =  .05, 
and that on  ift for the other eight  countries  rises to .68, s.e.  =  .04. Our 
conjecture is that the departure  of this estimated  coefficient  from unity 
reflects measurement  error in the construction  of expected  inflation. World  Real  Interest  Rates  .  53 
Table  7  STATISTICS  FOR  NINE-COUNTRY  SYSTEM  FOR  red,t 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Table  6, col-  Own  coefficients  on 4 world  Own  coefficients  on 3 
umn  1  variables  &  r_t-1  own  variables 
regression  regresn  -2  ?  logA  -2  ?  logA 
Country  R2  a  (5%=11.1)  R2  &  (5%=7.8)  R2  & 
BE  .78  .007  3.6  .81  .007  3.6  .77  .007 
CA  .58  .014  24.0  .69  .013  3.5  .62  .014 
FR  .74  .011  2.0  .74  .012  1.8  .75  .011 
GE  .38  .016  14.5  .67  .012  7.1  .40  .017 
JA  .12  .018  7.5  .35  .017  21.5  .42  .016 
NE  .54  .013  5.1  .58  .014  7.5  .64  .013 
SW  .70  .014  5.9  .76  .013  1.7  .72  .014 
UK  .47  .026  8.3  .68  .022  25.0  .68  .021 
US  .76  .010  2.7  .83  .009  3.4  .79  .010 
Note: Columns  1 and 2 provide  fit statistics for individual  countries for the system  regression  shown  in 
Table 6, column  1. Columns  3-5  deal with  systems  in which  individual  countries have separate coeffi- 
cients on four world variables (STOCK,  POIL, I/Y, and DM) and the lagged dependent  variable. Column 
3 gives  the  likelihood-ratio  statistic  (-2  ? log[likelihood  ratio]) when  these  individual  coefficients  are 
introduced  one country at a time.  Columns  4 and 5 give fit statistics for each country in a system  where 
all countries  have  individual  coefficients  on  the  five  variables  noted  above.  Columns  6-8  deal  with 
systems  in  which  individual  countries  have  separate  coefficients  on  three  own-country  variables 
(STOCK,  IIY, and DM), each expressed  as a deviation  from the corresponding  world variable. Column 6 
gives  the  likelihood-ratio  statistic when  these  individual  coefficients  are introduced  one  country  at a 
time. Columns  7 and 8 give fit statistics for each country in a system where all countries have individual 
coefficients  on the three own-country  variables. 
Columns  1 and 2 of Table 7 provide statistics (R2  and &)  for the individ- 
ual countries for the system  regression  from Table 6, column 1. Note that 
the model explains virtually none  of the variations in expected real inter- 
est rates for Japan. For the United Kingdom,  the high value of 6r  seems  to 
reflect mainly  the large negative  numbers  for rk,t in the mid-1970s.  The 
model  cannot  explain  these  values,  a finding  that is reasonable  if these 
observations  reflect  incorrect  estimates  of  Tk,t. 
We tested  the hypothesis  that the nine countries have the same coeffi- 
cients  on  the  four  world  variables,  STOCKw,t  _,  POIL,_1,  (I/Y)wd,t  _  and 
DM  d,  t_,  and the lagged  dependent  variable,  _t-. If we relax this restric- 
tion for one country at a time (with the other eight still restricted to have 
equal coefficients),  we get the likelihood-ratio  statistics shown  in column 
3 of Table 7. At the 5% critical level  (with five restrictions), the hypothe- 
sis of equality  is rejected for only  two countries,  Canada and Germany. 
For Canada, the main reason for rejection is that, unlike the other coun- 
tries, the unrestricted  coefficient  estimate for the lagged dependent  vari- 
able is close to zero (-.05,  s.e.  =  .08). 54 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
An overall test for equality of coefficients  across the nine countries (40 
restrictions) leads  to the likelihood-ratio  statistic of 83.1 compared to the 
5% critical value  of 55.5. Thus,  the model  fails to pass the test that each 
country's  expected  real interest  rate reacts in the same  way  to the four 
world variables and the lagged  dependent  variable. Columns  4 and 5 of 
Table 7 show  the  fit statistics  (R2 and  6)  for each  country  in the  unre- 
stricted form. The largest changes  from columns  1 and 2 (Canada, Ger- 
many,  Japan,  and  the  United  Kingdom)  correspond  to  the  likelihood- 
ratio statistics shown  in column  3. 
We also  allowed  each  country  to depend  in an individual  way  on its 
own  variables.  We constrained  the  coefficients  on  the  world  variables 
and the lagged  dependent  variable to be the same across the countries, 
but we  allowed  country  i to have  its own  coefficients  on the three vari- 
ables: STOCKi,  t_  -  STOCKd, t  l, (I/Y)i,t_l -  (I/Y)Wd,t-l,  andDMi,t_  -  DMwd,t-l 
By entering  these  variables  as deviations  from their world counterparts 
we  constrained  each country  to react in the same way  to equal changes 
in  world  and  own  variables,  for  example,  to  an  equal  increase  in 
STOCKd,  t1  and  STOCK,  t_.  But we  allowed  /,t  to react in an individual 
way  to a shift in the  own-country  variable,  say  STOCK,  _l,  for a given 
value  of the world  variable.  Presumably,  the more a country is isolated 
from world  markets  the  greater will  tend  to be the reaction of  it to the 
own  variables. 
We first introduced  the  own-country  variables  for one  country  at a 
time.  Own  variables  (except for the constant  and the lagged  dependent 
variable) were  excluded  for the  other  eight  countries.  (Recall that  the 
coefficients  of the world  variables and of the lagged  dependent  variable 
were constrained  to be equal for all nine countries.)  Column 6 of Table 7 
shows  likelihood-ratio  statistics for tests of the hypothesis  that the coeffi- 
cients  of  the  three  own-country  variables  are all zero.  We accept  this 
hypothesis  at the 5% critical level  for all countries  except Japan and the 
United  Kingdom.  Thus,  the  results  suggest  that  these  two  countries 
were  particularly isolated  (for at least part of the sample)  from interna- 
tional markets. 
We also  introduced  the  three  own-country  variables  simultaneously 
for all  nine  countries.  Individual  coefficients  on  these  variables  were 
estimated  for each  country.  An  overall test that all of these  coefficients 
were  zero  (27 restrictions)  led  to the likelihood-ratio  statistic 74.4 com- 
pared to the 5% critical value  of 40.1.  Thus,  the model  fails to pass  the 
test  that  own-country  expected  real interest  rates are unresponsive  in 
an  individual  way  to  own-country  variables  (given  common  reactions 
to world  variables  and  the lagged  dependent  variable). Columns  7 and World  Real  Interest  Rates  *  55 
8 of Table 7 show  fit statistics  (R2  and &) for each country in the model 
that  allows  individual  coefficients  for  all  countries  on  the  three  own 
variables.  The  largest  changes  from  columns  1 and  2  (Japan and  the 
United  Kingdom)  correspond  to the likelihood-ratio  statistics  shown  in 
column  6. 
10. System  for Individual  Countries'  Investment  Ratios 
We now relate the investment  ratio for each of the ten countries,  (I/Y),, to 
world  and  own-country  variables.  Unlike for the expected  real interest 
rate, r,  the null hypothesis  under  integrated  world  markets is not that 
(I/Y)it depends  only  on  world  variables.  (IIY),i would  depend  on  any 
variable that influences  own-country  investment  demand-notably,  the 
own-country  stock return,  STOCKi,  _,  and the lagged  investment  ratio, 
(I/Y)i,,_1-and  on  world  variables  through  their influence  on  the world 
expected  real interest  rate.  Given  the  world  variables  (and  hence  the 
world expected  real interest  rate), (I/Y)i,  would  be independent  of influ- 
ences  on  country  i's desired  saving  rate. Because  POILt_1 is a common 
influence  across countries,  the only variable of this type in the previous 
analysis was  own-country  monetary  growth,  DMi, _.  (The own-country 
fiscal variables  would  also  be  in  this  category,  but  the  fiscal variables 
were found  to be unimportant  in general.) 
Table 8 shows  the results for (I/Y)it  for the ten-country system of invest- 
ment  ratios  over  the  period  1959-88.  The  independent  variables  are 
POIL,_l;  the world  and own-country  lagged  values  of STOCK, (IIY), and 
DM; 4d,t-,;22 and individual  constant  terms.  The regression  in column  1 
shows  a significant,  positive  effect for STOCKi,,  (.017, s.e.  =  .003). This 
result can be interpreted as an effect from changes in the expected profit- 
ability of investment  in  country  i (or possibly  changes  in the  risk pre- 
mium  applicable  to  these  investments).  The  estimated  coefficient  of 
STOCKW,t 1,  however,  is  also  positive:  .017,  s.e.  =  .008.  If the  own- 
country stock return holds  constant  the expected  profitability of invest- 
ment (risk-adjusted),  then the world  stock return would  influence  (I/Y)t 
only through  its effect on world  expected  real interest rates; that is, the 
effect of STOCKWd, on (I/Y)i would  be negative.  It is possible,  however, 
that stock returns in other countries provide information about the profit- 
ability of investment  in country  i, even  for a given  value  of country i's 
22. Because the expected  real interest rate is unavailable for Italy we entered rd ,t-  for each 
country. The results change  little if we also include  rt-i  in the nine-country  system  that 
excludes  Italy. That is, lags of expected  real interest rates are unimportant in general for 
the investment  ratios. 56 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 









































Note:  The sample  period  is 1959-88. The dependent  variables  are (I/Y)it  for  ten countries. 
stock  return.23 This  outcome  might  arise  if ownership  extends  across 
countries or if the stock-price data for some countries are poor measures 
of the expected  profitability of investment  in those  countries. 
As in previous  results,  the regression  in Table 8, column  1 indicates  a 
significantly  negative  effect  of POILt_1  on the investment  ratios (-.020, 
s.e.  =  .006). One puzzle  is that the estimated  coefficient for own-country 
monetary  growth,  DMi,t,,  is  significantly  positive  (.039,  s.e.  =  .010), 
whereas  that on world monetary  growth,  DMwd  t-_,  is negative but insig- 
nificant  (-.049,  s.e.  =  .042).  Previously  we  found  an inverse  relation 
between  i  and the lag of world monetary growth,  not own-country  mone- 
tary growth  (Table 6, column  2). Thus, the interest-rate effects suggest  a 
positive  connection  between  DMWd,  t-  and (I/Y)it,  but the results indicate 
instead  a positive  coefficient  on DMi, _.  (Recall that, for the world vari- 
ables  in Table 3,  DMd,t-l  had  an insignificant  effect  on  (IY)wd,t.)  There  may 
be an endogenous-money  story to explain these results, but we have not 
yet come up with it. 
Column  2 of Table 8 eliminates  three world variables from the regres- 
23. As a related matter, Barro (1990) finds that Canadian investment  responds  more to the 
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sion: STOCKw t-l, (I/Y)w,  t-,  and DM,dt-_. Theoretically (abstracting from 
the  possible  informational  role  of  world  stock  prices  for own-country 
profitability),  these  variables  would  affect (I/Y)it  only  through  their ef- 
fects on the world  expected  real interest rate. The three world variables 
prove  to be jointly insignificant;  the likelihood-ratio  statistic is 2.9 com- 
pared to the 5% critical value of 7.8. 
It would  be  possible  to consider  the  system  of equations  for invest- 
ment ratios jointly  with  the system  for expected  real interest rates. The 
restrictions  imposed  by the  structural model  could  be imposed  on  this 
overall joint system.  We plan eventually  to undertake this grand-system 
estimation. 
11. Summary  of  Main  Results 
We thought  of the expected  real interest rate for the major industrialized 
countries  as  determined  by  the  equation  of  aggregate  investment  de- 
mand to the aggregate  of desired  national saving.  We used stock-market 
returns  to isolate  shifts  to expected  profitability of investment  (or risk 
premia) and,  hence,  to investment  demand.  We used  oil prices to cap- 
ture shifts to temporary income  and,  hence,  to desired  national saving. 
In some  models,  monetary  expansion  would  appear as a positive  shock 
to desired national saving,  and in others, fiscal expansion would  enter as 
a negative  shock. 
We used  the  structural  model  to  determine  a reduced  form for the 
"world" expected  real interest  rate and ratio of investment  to GDP. The 
main  predictions  are  that  more  favorable  stock  returns  raise  the  real 
interest  rate and investment,  higher  oil prices increase the real interest 
rate but decrease  investment,  higher  monetary  growth  lowers  the real 
interest  rate  and  stimulates  investment,  and  greater  fiscal  expansion 
raises the real interest  rate and reduces  investment. 
We estimated  the  reduced  form of the model  on  data for ten  OECD 
countries  over  the  period  1959-88.  Thus  far, the  results  pertain to an- 
nual  data on  short-term  interest  rates.  (Because  of data problems  with 
Italy  we  included  only  nine  countries  in  the  equations  for  interest 
rates.)  The  results  for  world  (GDP-weighted)  expected  real  interest 
rates  reveal  significant  effects  in  the  predicted  directions  for  world 
stock returns,  oil prices,  and  world  monetary  growth.  Fiscal variables 
turned  out  to be  unimportant.  The behavior  of  the  world  investment 
ratio was  also  consistent  with  the model,  except  that the hypothesized 
positive  effect  from monetary  growth  did not  show  up and fiscal vari- 
ables were unimportant. 58 - BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
Estimates of the reduced  form that were  constrained  by the structural 
restrictions led to estimates  of structural coefficients,  such as the respon- 
siveness  of  desired  national  saving  rates  to  the  expected  real interest 
rate. We find  that an increase  in the  expected  real interest  rate by one 
percentage  point  raises  the  desired  saving  rate by about one-third  of a 
percentage  point. 
We simulated  the  model  to try to explain  why  expected  real interest 
rates  were  high  for  1981-86  (averaging  4.2%)  and  low  for  1975-80 
(averaging  0.3%).  The  dominant  influence  was  the  variation  in  stock 
returns; these  returns  were  very  low  for 1974-79  and much  higher  for 
1980-85.  The increase in oil prices from the early 1970s until 1986 is also 
an  important  factor.  We  attributed  the  drop  in  expected  real interest 
rates  for  1987-88  (to  an  average  of  2.3%) mainly  to  the  decline  in  oil 
prices,  and  the  rise  in  the  rate  for  1989 (to  3.5%) mainly  to  the  im- 
proved  stock  market in  1988. The model  also  forecasts  a dramatic rise 
in the expected  real interest  rate to 5.6% in 1990. This value is almost a 
full percentage  point  above  the  highest  value  that occurred during the 
period  1958-89. 
We estimated  systems  of equations  for expected  real interest rates for 
nine OECD countries.  (We also estimated  systems  of equations for invest- 
ment  ratios  for  ten  OECD  countries,  including  Italy.) These  systems 
include  world  and  own-country  variables as regressors.  One  finding  is 
that  each  country's  expected  real  interest  rate  depends  primarily  on 
world  factors,  thereby  suggesting  a good  deal  of integration  of world 
markets.  We do  find,  however,  significant  effects  of own-country  vari- 
ables for Japan and the United Kingdom.  Our interpretation is that these 
countries  were  significantly  isolated  from international markets, at least 
over part of the period  1959-88. 
The research  carried out  thus  far suggests  a number  of avenues  for 
future  work.  The  possibilities  that  we  are presently  pursuing  are the 
analysis  of longer-term  interest  rates,  the  inclusion  of measures  of the 
profitability  of  investment,  the  addition  of  variables  such  as  defense 
expenditures  that represent exogenous  shifts to desired saving, consider- 
ation  of  tax  effects  related  to  interest  income  and  expenses,  and  the 
estimation  of equations  for expected  real interest  rates and investment 
ratios with  quarterly data. We are also considering  a division  of invest- 
ment  into  components  that  would  be  especially  sensitive  to the  stock 
market  (business  nonresidential  investment)  and  those  that would  be 
less  sensitive  (residential  investment,  public investment,  and purchases 
of consumer  durables).  Finally, we  are looking  into the possibilities  for 
adding more countries; Switzerland  and Australia appear to be the most 
promising  in terms of the availability of data. World  Real Interest  Rates  .  59 
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Note: The dependent  variable is the inflation rate for each country.  Each quarterly value is expressed  at an annual  rate. The sample  period  is 1952:2-1989:3.  S1 
is a dummy  for quarter 1 (January to April),  and so on.  AR(1) is the first-order autoregressive  error term and MA(1) is the first-order moving-average  error 
term. Q(4) is the Q Statistic with  4 lags. World  Real Interest  Rates *  61 
Table A2  DEFINITIONS AND  SOURCES OF VARIABLES  (DATA ARE 
ANNUAL  UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE) 
R  3-month  Treasury bill rate for January, April, July, October, except 
money-market  rate for France and Japan, from International  Financial 
Statistics (IFS) and OECD, Main Economic  Indicators. 
P  Consumer  price index  (1980=1.0),  seasonally  unadjusted,  for Janu- 
ary, April, July, October, from IFS. 
%t  4*log(Pt+  /Pt), quarterly. 
r  R-  r,  quarterly. 
Tef  Constructed  measure  of expected  inflation,  quarterly. 
re  R-  e,  quarterly. 
Y  Real GDP (deflator =  1.0 in 1980) from OECD National Accounts. 
I  Real gross domestic  capital formation (deflator =  1.0 in 1980) from 
OECD National Accounts. 
STOCK  Real rate of return on stock market. Nominal  returns are computed 
from IFS data for December  on industrial share prices. Consumer 
price inflation  (December-to-December)  was subtracted from the 
nominal  returns to calculate the real returns. 
POIL  Ratio of U.S.  PPI for crude petroleum  to overall U.S.  PPI (1982 
base),  from Citibase. 
DM  Growth rate of M1, computed  from December values  for M1 from 
IFS. 
RDEBTY  Ratio of end-of-year  real central government  debt (nominal debt at 
par value divided  by the December CPI) to real GDP. For BE, CA, 
FR, GE, IT, and NE, the debt figures are the sum of domestic  and 
foreign debt from IFS. For JA, the data are from Monthly Statistics of 
Japan;  for SW, Monthly Digest of Swedish Statistics;  for UK, Central 
Statistical Office, Annual Statistics;  for US, Economic  Report  of the 
President. 
RDEFY  Ratio of real budget  deficit to real GDP. The real budget  deficit is 
the change  in the real debt for the year. The real debt is the ratio of 
the nominal  debt to the December consumer  price index. 
RDEFYA  The residual from a regression  of RDEFY for each country over 
1958-87  on the current and four annual lags of the growth rate of 
real GDP. 
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bold  attempt  to  explain  the  "world"  real  interest  rate  with  a  simple 
model  in  which  that  rate  is  determined  by  the  condition  that  world 
investment  be  equal  to world  saving.  The paper is stimulating  to read 
and rich with  information  and puzzles.  It is written  in a commendable 
style-clear  about the data, candid about contradictory results.  Artful in 
the  specification  of the  model,  Barro and Sala-i-Martin are at the same 
time  disarmingly  diffident  about  the  theory.  Although  I have  reserva- 
tions  about  both  the  theory  and  some  of  the  authors'  conclusions,  I 
admire  their  willingness  to  tackle  an  inherently  difficult  problem  and 
their resourcefulness  in creating a coherent  picture of the experience  of 
the last 30 years. 
1. Overview  of the  Model 
The  authors'  model  is  "classical,"  consisting  simply  of  an  investment 
equation  and  a  saving  equation,  plus  the  condition  that  saving  and 
investment  be  equal.  Each equation  contains  only  one  right-hand-side 
endogenous  variable,  the real interest  rate. Since nothing  else is free to 
give,  the  real interest  rate is determined  by the  equilibrium  condition. 
Hence  the real rate is determined  by exogenous  factors shifting  invest- 
ment  or saving.  In the  authors'  specification  these  are few  in number; 
investment  depends  on a "q-like variable" and saving depends  on transi- 
tory income  and the real rate of interest. 
The theoretical framework the authors use for organizing their investi- 
gation has the virtue of simplicity, but its very simplicity precludes exami- 
nation of some  major hypotheses  about the movements  of the real rates 
during their sample  period.  The classical model  usually  comes  with  the 
assumption  that income  is always  at full employment.  The authors  do 
not  make  that  assumption  explicit,  and  indeed  they  allow  changes  in 
transitory income  to affect the saving  ratio. But, as in the classical full- 
employment  model,  adjustments  in income  play no role in transmitting 
shocks  to  interest  rates  or investment  ratios and  they  do  not  test  the 
validity  of that assumption.  Hence,  for example,  they  do  not examine 
the role that a worldwide  recession  may have played  in explaining  why 
real rates appear to fall following  OPEC 1. Indeed the reader will not find 
a figure or time series for income  in the paper. 
Similarly, the interplay of inflation,  income,  money, and nominal rates 
is not  modeled.  Prices are gotten  out  of the way  early, for most  of the 
analysis  an estimate  of inflationary expectations  is used  simply to calcu- 
late the expected  real rate from nominal  rate. The classical role of prices 
in maintaining  full  employment,  and  their success  in doing  so,  is not 
examined.  The transmission  mechanism  for monetary policy is missing. World  Real Interest  Rates *  63 
The authors  do  allow  the  possibility  of non-neutrality  of money  in the 
short run, but in their model  money  enters directly in the saving sched- 
ule,  with  monetary  expansion  presumed  to increase  saving  at a given 
real  rate  of  interest.  The  suppression  of  the  demand  and  supply  for 
money  obscures  the  way  in which  monetary  events  may affect invest- 
ment,  saving,  and interest  rates. Placing money  in the saving  function, 
with  income  exogenous,  in my view  does  not do justice to the possible 
role  of  money.  In the  usual  story,  an  increase  in  the  expected  rate of 
growth  of  money  and  associated  inflation  shifts  downward  the  stock 
demand for money  and decreases  the required rate of return on bonds or 
capital.  In  the  short  run  easy  money,  in  the  level  or expected  rate of 
change,  lowers  real rates as well  as nominal  because  price changes  do 
not  fully  offset  the  nominal  changes.  Hence,  expansionary  monetary 
encourages  investment  and increases  income.  These effects can be pres- 
ent  even  if  saving  is  inelastic  with  respect  to  interest  rates  and  real 
balances.  According  to the authors' model the reason tight money  raised 
real rates in 1979 was  because  it decreased  desired  saving,  not because 
reduction  of the  money  supply  forced  up  nominal  rates in the  money 
markets much more rapidly than inflation could possibly  subside. 
While I am somewhat  skeptical about the meaningfulness  of a "world" 
rate, particularly early in the sample period, focusing on an average of real 
rates for a number  of countries  can be a useful  enterprise  even  if world 
capital markets  are not  perfectly  integrated  and  the  assets  of different 
countries  are not  perfect  substitutes.  Averaging  real rates,  investment 
ratios and explanatory  variables across countries wash  out idiosyncratic 
fluctuations,  giving the investigator a better chance at detecting the impor- 
tance  of  common  factors  such  as  oil-price  shocks.  Such  shocks  to the 
world  economy  could  have  similar  affects  on  many  countries  even  if 
capital markets are not integrated.  But the authors' analysis does provides 
them some  evidence  on the extent of integration. 
How  many  countries  need  to be  considered  in analyzing  the  world 
interest rate is another question.  The authors assume  their ten countries 
are the entire world; hence  they do not need  to worry about an external 
sector and the role that export demand  and capital flows may play in the 
determination  of investment  and interest  rates. They argue that this is 
not an unreasonable  assumption  since  the countries  represent  approxi- 
mately  two-thirds  of world  output  and because  the observed  current- 
the account  balance  of the ten  country  aggregate  has been  small.  As a 
theoretical  matter the  fact that the  current account balance tends  to be 
small  is  not  a sufficient  condition  for treating  a group  of countries  as 
"closed"; on  the empirical level  the assumption  rules out a major issue 
surrounding  the effect of the OPEC oil price increases,  namely the extent 64  .  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
to which  the OPEC nations  increased their demand  for imports from the 
oil-consuming  nations,  and  "recycled" their  increased  income.  In the 
authors' model  these oil-price increases are treated simply as a transitory 
reduction  in income,  with  a negative  effect on saving. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Like any empirical investigation,  implementation  of the authors' model 
requires  a  multitude  of  judgments  about  specification  and  about  the 
empirical  counterparts  of  the  variables  appearing  in  the  theoretical 
model.  I found  most of the authors' decisions  sensible.  Furthermore, the 
authors  are well  aware  of  many  of  the  potential  difficulties  with  the 
particular choices  they  have  made.  Nevertheless  several  specification 
issues  are worth  mentioning. 
2. "The"  Real  Interest  Rate 
The expected  real rate of interest  is taken to be a short-term rate minus 
expected  inflation.  The authors'  recognize  that it would  be desirable to 
extend  the analysis  to the rates on assets  of longer maturities and differ- 
ent risks. Longer rates are probably a better approximation to the cost of 
capital than the short rate and its behavior is, if anything,  more puzzling 
than that of the short rate. The required rate of return on equity, presum- 
ably  more  relevant  to  investment  than  the  required  rate on  nominal 
assets,  not  only  contains  a substantial  risk premia but appears  to vary 
relative to the rates on nominal  assets.  A second  concern is the authors' 
use  of consumer  price indexes  in converting  to a real rate. Because  of 
OPEC and exchange  rate fluctuations  during the 1970s there was a sub- 
stantial  difference  between  the  inflation  in  consumer  prices  and  the 
inflation of capital goods  prices relevant to the cost of capital. Most firms 
were not experiencing  increases  in their product or capital goods  prices 
as large as those  faced by consumers.  Hence,  the authors may substan- 
tially  overstate  the  decline  in  the  real  rate  relevant  to  investment- 
expected  and  actual-during  that  period.  The  authors  do  report  two 
regressions  with  the  nominal  rate  as  the  dependent  variable  and  ex- 
pected inflation as an additional  explanatory variable. In these equations 
the  coefficients  on  the  other  variables  are  essentially  the  same  as  in 
expected  real rate equations,  but  the  estimate  on  expected  inflation  is 
less than one.  In the case of the country rate equations the point estimate 
is .562, over ten standard errors away from one.  Taken at face value this 
result suggests  that the expected  real rate is highly  negatively  correlated 
with the level of inflation.  The authors suggest  that the result is likely to World  Real  Interest  Rates  ?  65 
reflect measurement  error in expected  inflation,  but it should  be noted 
that studies  not  subject to that problem,  using  the nominal  rate to pre- 
dict future inflation,  get essentially  the same result. 
3. The  Investment  Equation 
The investment  equation is determined  by "a q-like variable"; prior stock 
returns and the change  in the real rate are used  to proxy for the change 
in  q. Investment  demand  is  expressed  as  a ratio to  GDP. Hence,  the 
elasticity of investment  with respect to income is assumed  to be one with 
adjustments  of investment  to income  entirely  within  the year. This as- 
sumption  is inconsistent  with  the results  of most  empirical work.  Since 
the  authors  use  gross,  not  net  investment,  depreciation  is implausibly 
assumed  to be a fixed proportion  of income. 
Stock returns are taken to be a proxy for future expected  profits. Em- 
pirically, stock returns do not do well in forecasting profits. For example, 
a simple regression  of the net rate of return on capital (private, nonfarm) 
on  two  lags  of  the  annual  stock  return yields  insignificant  coefficients 
and an R2 of less  than 4%. The stock market is forward looking,  and it 
seems  likely market returns reflect expectations  about a variety of factors 
other  than  profits  relevant  to  investment-including  future  monetary 
policy,  income,  and  inflation.  Hence,  the interpretation  of the positive 
coefficient  on the market return is open  to a wide  variety of interpreta- 
tions.  For example,  if the stock market does a good job forecasting infla- 
tion and  nominal  rates do  not fully adjust to inflation,  then  periods  of 
low market returns will be followed  by low real rates (assuming  inflation 
is bad for the market for at a given  real rate). While relating investment 
to  market  returns  is  itself  an  achievement,  it leaves  us  with  an  even 
greater need  to explain the market itself. 
Investment  is  taken  to  be  gross  domestic  capital  formation,  which 
includes  both residential  and public investment.  It does  not seem  likely 
that stock returns are a good  explanatory  variable for either. The inclu- 
sion  of  public  investment  also  implicitly  treats public investment  as a 
perfect substitute  for private.  This specification  could help explain why 
the authors find a significantly  positive  relationship between  investment 
and government  deficits,  a result they believe  is opposite  that predicted 
by models  where  fiscal deficits lower national saving.  If, in fact, govern- 
ment  investment  is less  than  a perfect  substitute  for private,  as seems 
likely,  then  exogenous  increases  in  public  investment,  correlated with 
the  deficit,  would  create  a  positive  correlation  between  gross  capital 
formation and the deficit even  with crowding  out. 66 *  BARRO  & SALA-I-MARTIN 
4. The  Saving  Equation 
Saving,  like investment,  is gross of depreciation  and expressed  as a ratio 
to income.  Hence,  the elasticity of saving with respect to current income 
is  one  for  a  given  ratio  of  transitory  to  permanent  income.  A  conse- 
quence of the assumption  that both the investment  and saving equations 
are expressed  in ratio form is that fluctuations  in income  can have  sub- 
stantial effects on investment  and saving. 
The relative price of oil is used as a measure of transitory income in the 
saving  equation  and excluded  from the investment  equation,  providing 
identification.  It could just as well be argued that it belongs  in the invest- 
ment  equation.  Some  of the  effect  of changes  in oil prices may be cap- 
tured by stock market returns; however  it can be argued that changes  in 
the relative  price of oil may  change  the relationship  between  marginal 
and  average  q.  Stock  returns  are excluded  from  the  saving  equation, 
thereby providing  identification.  For both wealth  and rate of return rea- 
sons it could be argued they belong. 
Although  their theoretical  specification  distinguishes  between  transi- 
tory and permanent  income,  in their estimation  the authors simply take 
the relative  price of oil as a measure  of transitory income.  The authors 
make no attempt  to econometrically  distinguish  between  transitory and 
permanent  changes  in income. 
The authors test for Ricardian equivalence by introducing the real value 
of  government  debt  and  its  change  (the  "real deficit"), both  cyclically 
adjusted  and unadjusted,  in the saving function.  These tests are not the 
centerpiece  of their study,  but I would  have  preferred a more extensive 
investigation  of possible  fiscal effects,  particularly since some  observers 
have argued that fiscal deficits are partly responsible  for the current high 
level of real rates. There are a number  of issues.  I am skeptical that this 
measure of the deficit is an adequate summary of the effect of government 
fiscal policy on saving; it attempts to capture rather different fiscal events 
in single a variable. First, in principle government  consumption,  govern- 
ment  investment,  and  taxes  could  have  quite different  effects.  Indeed, 
Ricardian theory itself distinguishes  among  these  three. The authors do 
report that an attempt  to find effects  of government  consumption  were 
unsuccessful.  Second,  whether  it is called money illusion or a distribution 
effect, there is empirical evidence  that the effect of a tax increase on saving 
is different  from that of a capital loss  of the same dollar value.  Further- 
more, changes  in real wealth due to changes  in the price level may have a 
different effect than changes  in market value associated  with changes  in 
interest rates. Lastly, it would  be desirable to distinguish,  for any of these 
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For testing  Ricardian equivalence  I would  also have preferred a more 
inclusive  measure  of government.  The authors'  fiscal measures  do not 
include  state and local governments.  For the United States, at any rate, 
the combined  government  deficit is substantially  different from the fed- 
eral deficit in the latter part of the sample,  with state and local surpluses 
partially offsetting  central deficits. 
As I believe  Lucas will discuss,  the model  gives  no role to the rate of 
growth  of  income  or consumption  in  the  determination  of  real rates. 
Such  differences,  in  theory,  should  be  important  in  explaining  differ- 
ences  in rates across countries. 
5. Results 
Notwithstanding  these  concerns  about  the  econometric  specification, 
world  stock  returns  and  oil  prices  are estimated  to have  positive  and 
significant  effects  on world  real interest  rates. The reduced  form equa- 
tions explain approximately  90% of the fluctuations  of interest rates and 
85% of investment  during  the  1959-1988  period.  The equations  do un- 
derpredict the decline  in the expected  real rate by approximately  1% for 
the  period  1975-80.  Unexpected  inflation  was  positive  during  most  of 
the period  so  the  equations  underpredict  the actual real rate by more. 
(The difference  between  expected  and actual real rates was  dramatic in 
1973-74.)  The equations  do better in predicting  the rise in the expected 
real rate in  the  1980s.  The  model's  forecast  of inflation,  however,  are 
typically low  during  this period; hence  actual real rates average about a 
percent below  the expected  real rate. 
Stock returns are the most important variable in explaining  variations 
in  the  real rate over  the  sample.  For example,  the  estimates  attribute 
about  2.5% points  of  the  approximately  4% rise  in  the  expected  real 
rate  between  1975  to  1980 and  1981 to  1986 to  higher  stock  returns 
during  the later period.  Oil prices  are also important,  their increase  in 
1975-1980  over the late 1960s partially offsets  the increase attributed to 
stock  prices,  and  further  increases  are estimated  to  add  1.9% to  the 
expected  real rate in  the  1980s.  Although  monetary  growth  is  signifi- 
cant in the  rate equations,  world  monetary  contraction explains  only  a 
small portion  of the  increase  in real rate during  the  1980s. Fiscal vari- 
ables are not significant. 
Investment  is positively  related to stock returns and negatively  related 
to  oil  prices,  consistent  with  both  the  theory  and  the  rate equations. 
However,  inconsistent  with  the predicted  effect of monetary  growth  on 
the real rate, it appears  to have  no  effect on investment.  Similarly, the 
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tive effects  on investment  even  though  they  appear to have  essentially 
no effect on rates. The authors suggest  the positive coefficients are incon- 
sistent  with  the view  that fiscal expansion  lowers  desired  national  sav- 
ing.  They need  not be for at least two  reasons.  First, proponents  of the 
view  that government  deficits  crowd  out  private investment  are refer- 
ring to the effect on national saving with output constant, either because 
monetary policy offsets  fiscal expansion  or because the economy  is oper- 
ating  at  capacity.  The  authors  do  not  control  for output;  endogenous 
increases  in output  in response  to fiscal stimulus  would  be expected  to 
increase saving,  and could even  induce  increases in private investment. 
Second,  as  discussed  above,  the  fact  that  the  authors  have  included 
government  investment  in their investment  series could explain a posi- 
tive coefficient. 
It is hard to argue against the proposition  that nominal short-term rates 
and  expected  exchange  rate changes  are tied  together  in international 
financial markets.  But given  the poor performance of purchasing  power 
parity it would be more of a surprise if real rates were tightly tied together. 
The authors investigate  the degree of integration by introducing country 
variables in the various  estimated  equations.  If capital markets are well 
integrated  and  assets  close  substitutes,  individual  countries'  real rates 
and investment  should primarily reflect world variables rather than coun- 
try variables; country saving,  however,  should  reflect individual country 
effects even  if markets are integrated. 
The  authors'  specification  provides  only  a weak  test  of  the  integra- 
tion hypothesis.  Separate intercepts and the own-country  lagged depen- 
dent  variable are included  in both  the  rate and  investment  equations. 
Hence,  systematic  differences  in  real rates  are not  taken  as  evidence 
against the hypothesis  and differences  in average values  of explanatory 
variables across  countries  are not allowed  to explain  cross-country  dif- 
ferences  in  investment  or  interest  rates.  For  example,  high  average 
investment  in Japan is not  credited  to a low-average  real rate or high- 
average  stock return.  The country  intercepts  and coefficients  on lagged 
own-country  dependent  variables that soak up these  country effects are 
highly  significant. 
In the  rate equations  world  stock  returns  do  hold  up  quite  well  in 
competition  with  country  returns.  The coefficient  (when  constrained  to 
be  equal  across  countries)  is  roughly  the  same  as  in  the  world  rate 
equation and own returns are insignificant.  World money  growth contin- 
ues  to be highly  significant,  whereas  own  money  is marginally signifi- 
cant and  of  the  "wrong"  sign.  These  results  suggest  a high  degree  of 
integration and substitution  between  different countries assets; however 
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magnitude  of the responses  should  also be equal. The authors' reject the 
hypothesis  of  equality  but  find  the  rejection  reflects  significant  differ- 
ences for only two of the nine countries. 
The integration  hypothesis  does  less  well  in the  case of investment. 
The coefficients  on world and country stock returns are about equal and 
half the  magnitude  of world  returns in the world  rate equation.  World 
money,  lagged  world  investment  and  real  rates  are  all  insignificant. 
Tested  jointly,  world  variables  are insignificant;  yet  all three  country- 
specific variables are highly  significant.  The authors are puzzled  by the 
importance  of own-country  monetary  expansion  given  the world rate is 
insignificant  and  own  money  has  the wrong  sign  in the rate equation. 
One  possible  explanation  is that investment  shocks,  with  resultant  in- 
creases  in  the  country's  income,  are  partially  accommodated  by  the 
monetary  authority. The significant,  and "wrong" signed  coefficient  on 
own  money  in the rate equation  could be similarly explained; since own 
investment  does  not appear to affect interest rates the shocks to income 
would  have to be from another source. 
In  some  respects  the  paper  is  quite  successful.  The  authors  have 
clearly  identified  important  comovements  of  real  rates,  investment, 
stock  returns,  and  oil  prices  during  this  30-year period.  Furthermore, 
they have  shown  that salient  features  of economic  performance  during 
this period are worldwide,  and that some phenomena  are best explained 
from  a  world  perspective.  The  results,  however,  do  not  give  strong 
confirmation  of  the  model.  As  the  authors  suggest,  there  is  room  to 
interpret the coefficients  on the two major "exogenous" variables-stock 
prices and the relative price of oil-in  alternative ways.  Their work does 
add  to  the  evidence  that  the  movements  of  the  stock  market are inti- 
mately connected  with  investment  and real rates-further  whetting  the 
profession's  appetite  for a satisfying  explanation  of the  market's own 
behavior.  The authors  promise  to continue  working  in this fruitful area 
and I look with anticipation  to reading their future work. 
Comment 
ROBERT  E. LUCAS,  JR. 
The paper  by  Barro and  Sala-i-Martin deals  with  the  determination  of 
interest rates in nine OECD countries  over the period 1959 to 1988, with 
particular emphasis  on the question  of why  real rates in all these  coun- 
tries were  so  high  in  the  1980s and  so  low  in  the  1970s. The authors 
construct  time  series  on  real interest  rates and other variables for each 
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country and then  aggregate  these  data to obtain series on a world econ- 
omy,  viewed  as  closed  in  the  sense  that  savings  and  investment  are 
assumed  to be equal.  They report regression  estimates  of equations  for 
world  real interest  rates and world  investment  (relative to output),  and 
also  report results  of  tests  on  the  quality  of the  one-world  abstraction 
they use. 
In my  comments  I will  focus  exclusively  on  the interest  rate results, 
first describing  the  procedures  used  in  the  study,  next  describing  the 
features of the results that are of most interest to me, and then interpret- 
ing these results from a Fisherian viewpoint  that differs from the theoreti- 
cal framework used  by the authors.  After this, I offer some  opinions  on 
the sources  of interest  rate movements  over the last 30 years. 
Barro and  Sala-i-Martin begin  by subtracting a calculated measure  of 
expected  inflation,  a distributed  lag  on  past  inflation  rates,  from each 
country's  nominal  interest  rate series.  They call the result the "expected 
real interest  rate," and  its weighted  average  over  the  countries  in the 
sample  the "world real interest  rate." This variable is then regressed  on 
its own lagged value,  a lagged measure of world stock returns, lagged oil 
prices,  the  lagged  ratio of investment  to  GNP, and  the  lagged  rate of 
world money  growth.  Some  fiscal variables are also used  as regressors, 
but their estimated  effects are negligible. 
Table 1 of the paper summarizes  the behavior of these world variables 
and of their counterparts  for the individual  countries.  The main results 
for the world  interest  rate are reported in Table 2. The responses  of the 
world real rate to the regressors  are substantial. I will just report that we 
used to call the "long-run" responses,  obtained by multiplying the coeffi- 
cients by one minus  the coefficient on the lagged  dependent  variable. A 
1% increase  in  stock  returns  (which  averaged  2.2% over  the  period) 
increases  the  real interest  rate by  0.13%. A  10% increase  in  oil prices 
(from its  mean  of  0.56)  would  add  .045% to real interest  rates.  A  1% 
increase in the world  rate of money  growth  would  reduce real rates by 
0.52%.  (These  numbers  are all taken  from  the  coefficients  in Table 2, 
column 2.) 
I was  interested  in  the  contributions  of real and  monetary  forces in 
explaining  nominal interest  rates,  and  so  attempted  to  decompose  the 
variance of nominal  rates based on the statistics reported in Table 2. This 
is not quite possible  from statistics reported in the paper, but assuming 
enough  orthogonality  in the right places,  one can get close.  Let r be the 
world nominal  rate, let XT  be the explained  part of the expected  inflation 
component,  let p be the explained  part of the expected  real component, 
and  let  E be  an  error:  r  =  p  +  n7 +  E. Assume  that  p,  -r,  and  e are  all 
mutually  uncorrelated,  so that Var(r) = Var(p) + Var(Ir)  + Var(E).  In this World  Real  Interest  Rates  .  71 
notation,  column  2 of Table 2 is a regression  of r-rr  on p and column  (5) 
is a regression  of r on p and  ir. Then  the R2 from column  2,  .89, is an 
estimate  of Var(p)/[Var(p)  +  Var(E)].  The R2 from column  (5),  .96, is an 
estimate of [Var(ir)  + Var (p)]/[Var7r)  + Var(E)].  From either column 2 or 5, 
Var(e) =  (.0054)2. Then the implied  variance of the explained  real rate is 
Var(p) =  (.0154)2 =  .000236. The implied  variance of the explained  infla- 
tion  premium  is Var(ir)  =  (.0215)2  =  .000464. 
In summary, then, Barro  and Sala-i-Martin view world nominal interest 
rates  as  a well  understood  time  series,  with  about  .96 of its  variance 
explained.  About  one-third  of this explained  variation in due to real fac- 
tors, and about two-thirds is attributed to expected inflation. According to 
their estimates,  world real interest rates were 2 or 3% higher in the 1980s 
than in the  1970s. They attribute this difference  to higher stock market 
returns in the  1980s,  and  slower  money  growth  and  higher  oil prices. 
In evaluating  these  conclusions,  I did not find the theoretical frame- 
work offered in the paper especially  helpful.  Barro and Sala i Martin use 
a Fisherian framework  to remove  the expected  inflation rate from each 
country's nominal  rate series,  and then switch to a kind of IS-LM set-up 
to interpret movements  in the real rate. Both lagged oil prices and lagged 
money  growth  are introduced  into  a savings  function,  rationalized  as 
indicators of temporary income.  (Oil price increases  depress  temporary 
income,  reduce  savings,  and  increase  real interest  rates.  Slow  money 
growth has the same effect.) Since temporary income is easy to measure 
directly, I did  not  see  the  advantage  of  this  indirect  method.  But my 
understanding  of the rationale for the separate savings  and investment 
functions  the authors use an inadequate  basis for any strong opinions  as 
to what variables belong  on the right side of either equation.  Anyway,  it 
is a free country  and I suppose  one  can calculate any sample  moments 
one likes. 
For myself,  I prefer  a more  thoroughgoing  Fisherian  viewpoint  for 
thinking  about real as well  as monetary  forces. According to Fisher, the 
expected  real rate can be expressed  both as an expected  marginal rate of 
substitution  between  current  and  future  consumption  and  as  an  ex- 
pected  marginal  productivity  of  capital,  so  one  can interpret the  right 
hand  side  of  Barro and  Sala i Martin's real interest  rate equation  as a 
conditional  expectation  of either or both of these  magnitudes.  From this 
point of view,  some  aspects  of the world real interest results reported in 
Table 2 seem  qualitatively  reasonable  and  some  do not.  An increase in 
stock  returns  or in  the  lagged  investment  rate can be  taken  to reflect 
optimism  about future marginal products  of capital that also raises real 
interest rates. Effects of lagged  money  growth in either direction can be 
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of a complementary  factor of production,  oil,  ought  to reduce  the  ex- 
pected  marginal  product  of  capital and  depress  real interest  rates,  al- 
though  any  quantitatively  reasonable  assessment  of  this  effect  that  I 
have seen  suggests  it is negligible. 
But there is an asymmetry  in Barro  and Sala-i-Martin's treatment of real 
and nominal  forces on nominal interest rates that makes the results diffi- 
cult to interpret in this Fisherian manner.  The variables that agents  are 
assumed  to use to form expectations  on future inflation-lagged  inflation 
rates-have  coefficients  (in explaining  nominal rates) that are taken from 
regressions  of actual inflation rates on lagged rates. That is to say, expecta- 
tions of inflation are required to be rational. The variables that agents are 
assumed  to use to form expectations  on future marginal productivities  of 
capital-stock  returns, lagged  investment,  and oil prices-are  simply in- 
cluded on the right side of the real interest rate equation with coefficients 
left free. The authors impose  no requirement that agents' forecasts of real 
returns be  rational expectations  of any  observable  magnitude.  No  evi- 
dence  is presented  that any of these  regressors  conveys  useful  informa- 
tion on future real returns to capital, or that the coefficients of any of these 
variables are consistent  with  this information. 
I think this is the reason that Barro and Sala-i-Martin's results seem so 
much more successful  than other recent attempts  to account for interest 
rate behavior in terms of fundamentals-variables  that provide informa- 
tion about the actual return on bonds.  Hansen  and Singleton  (1983), for 
example,  found  that  the  way  nominal  Treasury bill  returns  react  to 
lagged  variables in U.S.  monthly  data does  not correspond  at all well to 
the information  these variables contain on future inflation rates or future 
real returns. From Hansen  and Singleton's  viewpoint,  interest rates are a 
poorly understood  time series,  and we are thus in a poor position  to say 
why  they moved  however  they did in any particular period. If Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin had  required  their  expected  real interest  rate to be  a ra- 
tional  expectation  of future  real returns,  as Hansen  and  Singleton  did 
and as they themselves  did with the expected  inflation component,  they 
too  would  have  concluded  (I conjecture)  that interest  rates are poorly 
understood  series. 
I hope  it is  clear that these  are difficulties  that arise within  my  pre- 
ferred framework,  not within  Barro and Sala-i-Martin's. They use an IS- 
LM framework  that I do not understand  and do not attempt to criticize 
or interpret.  What  I have  argued  is  that  if one  interprets  their results 
from  a Fisherian  viewpoint,  both  their  decomposition  of  interest  rate 
movements  into a real and expected  inflation component  and their con- 
clusion that the real component  is well explained  by the lagged variables 
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In fairness, I should add that while I have been referring to the Fisherian 
framework for thinking  about interest rates, it is far from clear what this 
framework is in an application involving  many countries.  Does one view 
the entire world  as operating  in a full set of Arrow-Debreu  markets? Or 
should  some assets be viewed  as nontradable and, if so, which and why 
are they  not? By simply  postulating  investment  and savings  functions, 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin have evaded  these  questions,  but by discussing 
the nine OECD countries  as a single Fisherian economy,  so have I. 
Why were real interest  rates so high  in the 1980s? I think a discussant 
who  disputes  a paper's  answer  to an interesting  substantive  question  is 
under some  obligation  to supply  one of his own,  and this I will do (with 
suitable qualification).  Consumption  growth  (in the United  States) was 
about  1 higher  (.038)  in  the  1960s and  1980s than  in  the  1970s (.029). 
Since  the  real rate is linear in the  rate of consumption  growth,  with  a 
coefficient  equal to the coefficient  of risk aversion,  one can explain per- 
haps a 2 difference  in interest  rates between  the 1980s and the 1970s as 
real. This is  an  outside  estimate,  I think,  since  it assumes  that the in- 
creased  consumption  growth  was  expected  and because  I think a risk 
aversion coefficient  of 2 is on the high  side. 
Beyond  this,  I would  attribute all the remaining difference in nominal 
rates, and most of the year-to-year variance in these rates, to changes  in 
expected  inflation rates. Throughout  most of the 1970s, I think people  in 
the  OECD  countries  expected  inflation  rates  to  be  reduced  to  earlier 
levels;  throughout  most  of  the  1980s,  they  expected  high  inflation  to 
resume.  After the  fact, these  beliefs  were  proven  wrong  and for many 
years they were less accurate than extrapolations based on inflation rates 
in  the  recent  past  would  have  been.  The  alternative  view,  within  a 
Fisherian framework,  is that people  repeatedly  underestimated  real re- 
turns  on  capital  throughout  the  1970s  and  then  repeatedly  overesti- 
mated real returns through  the 1980s. 
The point  is  that people's  expectations  were  wrong  about something 
during this period.  We can choose  to interpret these errors as mistakes in 
forecasting the relatively  smooth  series on marginal rates of substitution 
and transformation,  or we can interpret them as errors in forecasting the 
monetary and fiscal policies  of the governments  of the OECD countries. 
This may seem an unattractive choice to have to make, and I suppose  we 
would  all like to have  some  more options-but  what are they? 
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Discussion 
Barro responded  to the discussants  by noting  that the treatment of pub- 
lic investment  does  not affect the results.  He also suggested  the price of 
oil could affect investment  demand  in addition to desired savings  due to 
differences  in marginal and average q or to irreversibility of investment, 
but that without  better instruments  they used just the price of oil. 
Robert Hall noted  in  response  to Robert Lucas that changes  in con- 
sumption  are unrelated  to interest rates, suggesting  that there is a good 
deal  of noise  in consumption.  He  also  wondered  whether  the authors 
should  have considered  the underlying  fundamentals  driving the finan- 
cial variables.  Barro replied  that this would  not present  an econometric 
problem. 
Greg Mankiw noted  that the paper examines ex-post interest rates and 
suggested  looking  at ex-ante  rates as well.  Robert Lucas asked why  the 
authors did not interpret the issue  in terms of marginal rates of substitu- 
tion and transformation.  John Cochrane suggested  that marginal rates of 
substitution  are roughly  constant  through  time. 
David  Wilcox  noted  that  the  authors  were  not  doing  a  purely  Ri- 
cardian experiment  since  they  did not control for expected  government 
spending  in the regression.  He also suggested  the authors could impose 
unified  capital markets  when  looking  at expected  inflation  in different 
countries.  Barro responded  that they didn't have expected  spending  and 
actual government  spending  was insignificant  in the regressions. 
Ben Bernanke  suggested  that the  assumption  that real interest  rates 
are the  same  in all countries  requires purchasing  power  parity to hold. 
He also noted  that if the real interest rate is constant people  consistently 
over- or underestimate  inflation. 
Stanley Fischer noted that the deficit measure ignores monetary financ- 
ing  of the  deficit.  Barro responded  that they  would  look at that issue. 
Mankiw suggested  that the authors were correct in choosing  the frame- 
work they did rather than focusing  on marginal rates of substitution  and 
transformation.  He also asked  whether  the authors had an explanation 
for the  relation  between  money  changes  and  investment  rates.  Barro 
responsed  that they did not have a good  explanation  for this. 